Crowdsourcing Clinical Trials by Darrow, Jonathan J.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2014
Crowdsourcing Clinical Trials
Jonathan J. Darrow
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Darrow, Jonathan J., "Crowdsourcing Clinical Trials" (2014). Minnesota Law Review. 298.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/298
  
 
805 
Article 
Crowdsourcing Clinical Trials 
Jonathan J. Darrow†
[T]he FDA has released too many drugs for sale only to have to 
take them off the market later as new information concerning 
side effects develops. Under this procedure it is the American 
people who unknowingly serve as guinea pigs for experiments 
by the drug companies. 
 
 —U.S. Senator Estes Kefauver et al. (1962)1
  INTRODUCTION   
 
Pharmaceutical approval today suffers from a serious ethi-
cal flaw: newly FDA-approved drugs are de facto “tested” on an 
unknowing general public in the months and years immediate-
ly following drug approval,2 without either the informed con-
sent of the consuming public or an understanding by the public 
of the risks that remain.3 This post-approval human “testing” 
occurs due to the inherent inability of even the largest clinical 
trials to detect rare adverse events,4
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Bentley University. The author wishes to thank Holly Lynch, Benjamin Roin, 
Glenn Cohen, Christopher Robertson, Adriana Benedict, Yoni Schenker, 
Stephanna Szotkowski, Thea Reilkoff, Jeffrey Skopek, Nicholson Price, Donald 
Light, Ameet Sarpatwari and Aaron Kesselheim for their helpful contribu-
tions. Any errors remain the author’s own. Copyright © 2014 by Jonathan J. 
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 as became famously evi-
 1. S. REP. NO. 87-1744, at 43 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2884, 2907. 
 2. See Jesse A. Berlin et al., Adverse Event Detection in Drug Develop-
ment: Recommendations and Obligations Beyond Phase 3, 98 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1366, 1367 (2008) (“Drugs are therefore, as a rule, made available for 
public use before rare but potentially serious [adverse] reactions have been 
identified and their probability quantified.”). 
 3. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 4. Berlin et al., supra note 2, at 1367 (“[P]remarketing studies of new 
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dent following the high profile withdrawal of Vioxx® (rofecoxib), 
a pain medicine launched in 19995 that is estimated to have 
caused the death of more than 26,400 people before it was re-
moved from the market in 2004.6 In addition, although new 
drug development costs continue to rise rapidly, a disconcerting 
number of new drugs are no more effective than older, cheaper 
drugs,7 and in many cases nearly indistinguishable in efficacy 
from placebo.8 These two phenomena are not unrelated: clinical 
trial costs are rising in part because so many drugs are mini-
mally effective in producing the desired results, owing to the 
inverse relationship between the degree of efficacy and the 
number of subjects needed to establish that efficacy with the 
requisite level of certainty.9
 
pharmaceuticals cannot reliably detect rare, but potentially important, ad-
verse events.”). 
 As with safety, the consuming pub-
 5. Snigdha Prakash & Vikki Valentine, Timeline: The Rise and Fall of 
Vioxx, NPR (Nov. 10, 2007, 2:40 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story 
.php?storyId=5470430.  
 6. See infra note 132; Merck Announces Voluntary Worldwide Withdraw-
al of VIOXX(R), PRNEWSWIRE (Sept. 30, 2004), http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/ 
news-releases/merck-announces-voluntary-worldwide-withdrawal-of-vioxxr 
-156068395.html. 
 7. See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW 
THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 76 (2004) (“In fact . . . drugs can 
be approved that are actually worse than drugs already on the market.”); 
L’année 2011 du Médicament: Un Sursaut en France en Faveur des Patients 
après Mediator, dans un Contexte de Surplace Général [New Drugs and Indi-
cations in 2011: France Is Better Focused on Patients’ Interests After the Medi-
ator Scandal, But Stagnation Elsewhere], 32 LA REVUE PRESCRIRE 134, 135 
(2012) (Fr.), translated in 21 PRESCRIRE INT’L 106, 107 (2012) (evaluating 998 
new drugs between 2002 and 2011 and concluding that only two were true 
breakthroughs). 
 8. See, e.g., Irving Kirsch et al., The Emperor’s New Drugs: An Analysis 
of Antidepressant Medication Data Submitted to the U.S. Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, PREVENTION & TREATMENT, July 15, 2002, at 10, available at 
http://alphachoices.com/repository/assets/pdf/EmperorsNewDrugs.pdf (con-
cluding that the difference in efficacy between various antidepressant drugs 
and placebos was “relatively small . . . and its clinical significance . . . dubi-
ous”). 
 9. See generally Allan Donner, Approaches to Sample Size Estimation in 
the Design of Clinical Trials—A Review, 3 STAT. MED. 199 (1984) (presenting 
the various methods used to calculate sample sizes for clinical trials and re-
viewing their application in practice); P.M. Fayers & D. Machin, Sample Size: 
How Many Patients Are Necessary?, 72 BRIT. J. CANCER 1 (1995) (discussing 
the need to calculate sample sizes in clinical trials and the problems that arise 
in their calculation which often lead to inadequate class sizes and misleading 
results); Stephen L. George & M.M. Desu, Planning the Size and Duration of a 
Clinical Trial Studying the Time to Some Critical Event, 27 J. CHRONIC DIS-
EASES 15 (1974) (discussing the methods used to derive the required number 
of patients and necessary duration of clinical trials by looking at the time to 
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lic and even physicians often fail to appropriately distinguish 
between truly effective drugs and those of minimal value.10
I.  THE PROBLEM: CURRENT DRUG APPROVAL 
PRACTICE AND THE REQUIREMENT OF CONSENT   
 This 
Article explores the possibility of crowdsourcing the post-
approval phase of clinical trials as a means of supplementing 
existing clinical trial practice in order to address safety con-
cerns, clarify efficacy levels, and gather post-approval adverse 
event data in a manner more ethical than the current practice. 
New drugs generally cannot be approved in the United 
States without undergoing lengthy and expensive clinical tri-
als,11 which by law involve clinical testing on human subjects.12 
Although the institution of informed consent requirements 
helps to reduce the concern that might otherwise be directed 
against such testing,13 consent is an imperfect solution to the 
evaluation of new drugs. Even in an ideal world where subjects 
have full understanding of all aspects and implications of a tri-
al, informed consent is not a complete solution, in part because 
human testing exposes subjects to risk notwithstanding their 
consent and full information. More importantly for present 
purposes, the informed consent that protects pre-approval 
study subjects is not applicable to drugs administered during 
post-approval clinical care.14
 
some critical event); John M. Lachin, Introduction to Sample Size Determina-
tion and Power Analysis for Clinical Trials, 2 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 
93 (1981) (discussing the importance of calculating a sample size in a clinical 
trial and the general methods for deriving a sample size and power analysis). 
 This Part explores the fundamen-
tal paradox associated with clinical testing of new drugs, the 
ethical issue that follows approval of those drugs, and the inad-
equacy of informed consent in mitigating this ethical failing.  
 10. See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Para-
digm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 419, 498 (2010) (“[E]fficacy failure is estimated to occur with 
30–60% of the prescriptions written in the United States.”). The problem of 
minimal or nonexistent efficacy is not limited to drugs, however. It has been 
noted that “about 50 percent of common medical practices, which are routinely 
reimbursed by CMS and other payers, may be of no benefit to patients.” Ra-
chel A. Lindor, Advancing Evidence-Based Medicine by Expanding Coverage 
with Evidence Development, 52 JURIMETRICS J. 209, 210 (2012). 
 11. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of 
Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 153–54 (2003). 
 12. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012).  
 13. See infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 53–61 and accompanying text. 
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A. THE PARADOX OF HUMAN TESTING 
The fundamental paradox of clinical trials lies in the fact 
that their purpose is to screen out drugs whose risk-benefit ra-
tio is unacceptable, in order to avoid exposing people to worth-
less or harmful drugs.15 Yet because computer modeling, in 
vitro testing, and animal experimentation are not fully predic-
tive of a drug’s behavior in a human, the only way to ultimately 
determine the risk-benefit ratio of a drug is to administer it to 
humans and see what happens16
This paradox has been partially addressed in two principal 
ways: (1) phased testing; and (2) informed consent. Under the 
phased approach, testing begins with a pre-clinical laboratory 
phase that may involve in vitro testing, computer modeling, 
and animal testing, the results of which must provide a basis 
for the drug sponsor to conclude that the drug is “reasonably 
safe” for human testing to begin.
—the very scenario that clini-
cal testing is supposed to prevent. 
17 Human testing, more com-
monly known by the somewhat euphemistic designation of 
“clinical trials,” is itself divided into phases, generally progress-
ing from twenty to eighty people in Phase 1, to several hundred 
in Phase 2, to several thousand in Phase 3,18 with continuous 
and periodic evaluation to determine whether further progres-
sion is warranted.19 Generally following Phase 3 trials, the FDA 
will evaluate the drug candidate’s dossier and either approve or 
reject the drug.20
In addition to phased testing, clinical trial participants 
must also give their informed consent prior to participation in a 
 This progressive, phased design reduces as 
much as possible the number of people exposed to a new drug 
at each phase.  
 
 15. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (requiring the FDA to refuse to approve a new 
drug if, on the basis of “adequate and well-controlled investigations,” the drug 
is not both safe and effective).  
 16. The Declaration of Helsinki, for example, recognizes that “[m]edical 
progress is based on research that ultimately must include studies involving 
human subjects.” World Medical Association [WMA], Declaration of Helsinki: 
Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, at ¶ 5 
(Oct. 2008).  
 17. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(8) (2013) (covering “[p]harmacology and toxi-
cology information”). 
 18. See id. § 312.21 (covering “[p]hases of an investigation”). 
 19. See id. § 312.32(b)–(c) (covering periodic review and reporting to FDA); 
id. § 312.33 (covering “[a]nnual reports”).  
 20. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (requiring that a new drug application 
contain “full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether 
or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use”). 
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study.21 Such consent helps to ensure that participants are ad-
equately informed of the uncertainty regarding the risks and 
benefits of the product that is being tested and are voluntarily 
allowing themselves to be subjected to those risks.22
Unfortunately, the protections of informed consent largely 
cease to apply once government approval is granted.
  
23 At that 
very same moment, the careful expansion of the number of sub-
jects exposed to an experimental drug under phased testing 
turns to a sudden explosion in patient consumption following 
approval.24
B. THE ETHICAL ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 
 This confluence of dramatically increased usage and 
reduced protections sets the stage for a serious—but oddly un-
der-appreciated—ethical conundrum.  
Even after the government approves a drug and releases it 
to the public, all of the drug’s characteristics will not yet be 
known. As a Senior Medical Officer of the European Medicines 
Agency (the European analogue to the FDA) has pointed out, 
the particular moment of a drug’s approval is somewhat arbi-
trary, occurring in the middle of a gradual increase in regula-
tors’ understanding of the drug at a point where information is 
considered to be sufficient, but certainly not complete.25 There 
is nothing magical that occurs the day a drug is approved; the 
drug is no safer the morning following approval than it was the 
night before, when sales were prohibited.26 Although it is true 
that under current law drugs must be deemed safe and effec-
tive prior to being placed on the market,27
 
 21. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2013).  
 the phrase “safe and 
effective” represents not a mathematical or scientific certainty, 
 22. See id. 
 23. See infra notes 56–61 and accompanying text. 
 24. See sources cited infra notes 32–33. 
 25. See Hans-Georg Eichler, Senior Med. Officer, European Medicines 
Agency, Presentation at Brigham & Women’s Hospital, Division of 
Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics: Adaptive Licensing for New 
Drugs: Implications for Comparative Effectiveness Research (Sept. 12, 2012) 
[hereinafter Eichler, Presentation on Adaptive Licensing for New Drugs]; see 
also Hans-Georg Eichler et al., Balancing Early Market Access to New Drugs 
with the Need for Benefit/Risk Data: A Mounting Dilemma, 7 NATURE RE-
VIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 818, 822 (2008) (providing a graphical illustration of 
the gradually increasing “knowledge surface” over time and its relationship to 
drug approval thresholds). 
 26. Eichler, Presentation on Adaptive Licensing for New Drugs, supra 
note 25.   
 27. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2012).  
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but a legal assessment. The unstated but obvious reality is that 
this legal assessment is sometimes later proven to be wrong. 
That significant uncertainty remains even following FDA-
approval is evident from the fact that new drugs are sometimes 
withdrawn, often within a few years of approval, following a se-
ries of severe adverse events or deaths.28 The FDA acknowledg-
es, as it must, that clinical trials do not provide complete in-
formation with respect to risk.29
The occurrence of de facto testing is reason for concern, but 
the practice might be justified on the basis that there is simply 
no other alternative. At some point a drug must be either re-
leased to the public or rejected. Although requiring larger clini-
cal trials might appear to be an obvious solution, rare adverse 
events are difficult or impossible to discern in even the largest 
clinical trials.
 Because risks remain and data 
continues to be collected, new drugs are undergoing de facto 
“human testing” after receiving the FDA’s seal of approval. 
30
 
 28. See Thomas N. Tiedt, The Drug Safety System Conundrum, 62 FOOD 
& DRUG L.J. 547, 548 (2007) (“High-profile market withdrawals of high-
revenue prescription drugs spurred by the notoriety of life threatening drug 
reactions identified after FDA approval and broad patient use have cost the 
pharmaceutical industry billions of dollars in lost annual revenues (e.g., Vioxx, 
Bextra, Baycol, Rezulin, Lotonex, Propulsid, Seldane, Pondimin, Redux).”); 
James L. Zelenay, Jr., The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food 
and Drug Administration Always a Better Food and Drug Administration?, 60 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 261, 308 n.412 (2005). Scholars have indicated that short-
ened or last-minute decisions by the FDA are more likely to result in a harm-
ful drug being approved. Daniel Carpenter et al., Drug-Review Deadlines and 
Safety Problems, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354, 1354 (2008); see also Clark 
Nardinelli et al., Drug Review Deadlines and Safety Problems, 359 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 95, 96 (2008) (containing author’s reply by Daniel Carpenter); Mary K. 
Olson, The Risk We Bear: The Effects of Review Speed and Industry User Fees 
on New Drug Safety, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 175, 175 (2008) (“[F]aster reviews 
are associated with increased counts of serious adverse drug reactions.”).  
 Vioxx, for example, had undergone a relatively 
large Phase 3 trial involving 8076 subjects, but the trial was 
 29. Stephen A. Goldman et al., Clinical Therapeutics and the Recognition 
of Drug-Induced Disease, MEDWATCH (FDA), June 1995, at 1, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/MedWatch/UCM168515.pdf (“[I]n most 
cases [clinical trials] are neither large enough nor long enough to provide all 
information on a drug’s safety.”). 
 30. See J.A. Lewis, Post-Marketing Surveillance: How Many Patients?, 2 
TRENDS IN PHARMACOLOGICAL SCI. 93, 93 tbl.I (1981) (presenting the number 
of patients required to detect rare adverse events). Similarly, differences in 
efficacy may not be clear even with relatively large trials. See Salim Yusuf et 
al., Why Do We Need Some Large, Simple Randomized Trials?, 3 STAT. MED. 
409, 412 (1984) (“It is not sufficiently widely appreciated just how large clini-
cal trials really need to be, in order to detect such moderate differences [in 
therapeutic benefit] reliably.”). 
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nevertheless “not powerful enough to reliably detect rare ad-
verse events with a prevalence of 1%–2% compared with place-
bo.”31 Once pre-approval clinical trials are completed and the 
drug is released on the market, however, the number of people 
using it will generally increase dramatically,32 in some cases by 
a factor of 1000 or more.33 This explosion in consumption can 
reveal rare, but serious adverse events such as death.34
The ethical elephant in the room is that the general public 
is largely unaware of the risks that remain with newly ap-
proved drugs,
  
35 and does not sufficiently appreciate the extent 
to which understanding of a drug continues to evolve following 
approval. To state the ethical problem more concisely, under 
the current system patients are being used as de facto test sub-
jects following drug approval without their knowledge or in-
formed consent.36 When adverse events do occur, the unfortu-
nate victims or their loved ones understandably feel betrayed.37
 
 31. Mark Greener, Drug Safety on Trial, 6 EMBO REP. 202, 203 (2005).  
 
 32. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD 
PHARMACOVIGILANCE PRACTICES AND PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGIC ASSESSMENT 
3 (2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/regulatoryinformation/ 
guidances/ucm126834.pdf.  
 33. In the case of Vioxx, approximately twenty million people worldwide 
took the drug in a span of five years. Alex Berenson, For Merck, the Vioxx Pa-
per Trail Won’t Go Away, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, at A1.  
 34. See sources cited supra note 28. 
 35. See Are Prescription Drugs Safe? Not Necessarily, CONSUMER-
REPORTS, Nov. 2009, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2012/05/are 
-prescription-drugs-safe-not-necessarily/index.htm (“The Food and Drug Ad-
ministration approved them, your doctor prescribes them, and you see them 
advertised on TV—so your medications must be safe, right?”); Trisha Torrey, 
Is it Possible Newly FDA Approved Drugs and Medical Devices Aren’t Safe?, 
ABOUT.COM, http://patients.about.com/od/drugsandsafety/f/Is-It-Possible 
-Newly-FDA-Approved-Drugs-And-Medical-Devices-Are-Not-Safe.htm (last 
updated June 20, 2013) (feeling the need to answer the question posed in the 
article title); see also Paul Slovic et al., Risk Perception of Prescription Drugs: 
Results of a National Survey, 41 DRUG INFO. J. 81, 98 (2007) (concluding gen-
erally that “[p]rescription medicines were perceived to be high in benefit and 
low in risk”); sources cited infra notes 37, 39, 263, 269. 
 36. The type of consent needed in an ordinary treatment (as opposed to 
research) setting is referred to as “consent to treatment” and is addressed in-
fra Part II.D. 
 37. See, e.g., Patrick McDonnell, Chapter 9: Drug Safety and 
Pharmacovigilance, in MODERN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: A PRIMER 189 
(Thomas M. Jacobsen & Albert I. Wertheimer eds., 2010) (“[T]he FDA has let 
the American people down, and, sadly, betrayed a public trust.” (quoting an 
FDA safety official following the Vioxx withdrawal)); ADHD Drug Linked to 
500 Percent Increased Risk of Sudden Death in Children, HEALTH WATCH 
(Dec. 2010), http://www.manataka.org/page2355.html (“[Parents] believe the 
FDA wouldn’t approve a drug so dangerous that it could kill their child with-
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They assumed, reasonably, that the FDA-approved drug was 
safe and effective. “[S]afe . . . and . . . effective” is, after all, cen-
tral to the legal standard for drug approval.38 Disclaimers in 
the labeling, when they exist, may affect liability but do not 
substantially diminish the sense of betrayal since labels are 
almost never understood or even read by patients,39 let alone by 
family members.40
This ethical problem is not new. In the Senate Report to 
the 1962 Drug Amendments, Senators Kefauver, Carroll, and 
others complained that “the FDA has released too many drugs 
for sale only to have to take them off the market later as new 
information concerning side effects develops. Under this proce-
dure it is the American people who unknowingly serve as guinea 
pigs for experiments by the drug companies.”
 A means of effectively communicating the 
remaining risk is needed.  
41
 
out warning. And they believe the drug companies would never sell products 
that harm people.”); cf. CHUCK WHITLOCK, MEDISCAMS: DANGEROUS MEDICAL 
PRACTICES AND HEALTH CARE FRAUDS—AND HOW TO PREVENT THEM FROM 
HARMING YOU AND YOUR FAMILY 224 (St. Martin’s Griffin 2003) (“We’d all like 
to think . . . that the FDA wouldn’t allow unsafe products to be sold in the U.S. 
at all . . . .”); Eric Zicklin, I.V. League, SPY, Mar. 1994, at 18, 18 (“The FDA 
wouldn’t let them give us anything too dangerous.”(internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Democratic Members Urge FDA to Act on Tanning Salon Dangers, 
FOX 31 DENVER (Feb. 17, 2012, 10:19 AM ), http://littleton.kdvr.com/news/ 
health/110499-democratic-members-urge-fda-act-tanning-salon-dangers 
(“[T]he FDA wouldn’t approve tanning salons if it weren’t safe.” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).  
 The Senators’ 
criticism was directed at the pre-1962 approval process under 
which a new drug application would automatically become ef-
fective, thereby allowing the drug sponsor to market the drug 
 38. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012).  
 39. See D.C. Berry et al., Provision of Information About Drug Side-Effects 
to Patients, 359 LANCET 853, 853–54 (2002); Saul Shiffman et al., Consumer 
Understanding of Prescription Drug Information: An Illustration Using Anti-
depressant Medication, 45 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 452, 456 (2011) (find-
ing that key warnings and directions “were not understood by a substantial 
majority of the respondents”); Almut G. Winterstein et al., Evaluation of Con-
sumer Medication Information Dispensed in Retail Pharmacies, 170 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 1317, 1319–20 (2010) (noting that 6% of 365 pharmacies sur-
veyed provided no written information, none provided the official package in-
sert, and of those that provided written information there were “[l]arge dispar-
ities in quality and length”); Andrew Moore & Henry McQuay, Do Patients 
Understand Side-Effect Risks?, PULSE, Nov. 29, 2004, at 42, 42.  
 40. See H. Shonna Yin et al., Health Literacy Assessment of Labeling of 
Pediatric Nonprescription Medications: Examination of Characteristics that 
May Impair Parent Understanding, 12 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 288, 294 (2012). 
 41. S. REP. NO. 1744 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2884, 2907 
(emphasis added). 
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to the public, sixty days after the application was submitted.42 
The solution, according to Kefauver and his colleagues, was to 
give the FDA more time to review a drug by eliminating the au-
tomatic approval provision.43 The resulting 1962 law, still in ef-
fect today, gives the FDA 180 days to either approve a drug or 
give notice to the applicant of the opportunity for a hearing.44 
This well-intentioned solution, however, does not fully resolve 
the problem. No matter how much time the FDA has to consid-
er a new drug application, it simply will not have sufficient da-
ta with respect to rare adverse events—data that can only be 
generated by the dramatic increase in usage that will generally 
occur following approval.45
Once drugs are released on the market, it often becomes 
apparent fairly quickly which are less safe than previously be-
lieved. A task force report to the FDA commissioner notes that 
“[i]n most cases, withdrawals occur during the first or second 
year following approval,” though “there have been cases where 
drugs were withdrawn 3, 4, and up to 5 years after approval.”
  
46 
In fact, the long tail of drug withdrawals appears to be longer 
than these statements might suggest. Qureshi et al. recently 
identified 740 drugs approved by the FDA between 1980 and 
2009, and determined that thirty of them had been withdrawn 
for safety reasons.47
 
 42. Id. at 2905. 
 Although these researchers were primarily 
 43. Id. at 2907. 
 44. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780, 784 
(1962) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(1) (2012)).  
 45. TASK FORCE ON RISK MGMT., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MANAGING THE 
RISKS FROM MEDICAL PRODUCT USE: CREATING A RISK MANAGEMENT FRAME-
WORK 28–29 (1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/ 
SafetyofSpecificProducts/UCM180520.pdf. Another possibility is to slow down 
the U.S. approval process such that drugs are first released in foreign mar-
kets, thereby intentionally recreating the drug lag of decades past. In addition 
to the obvious ethical problem in doing so, such a “solution” would merely shift 
the burden elsewhere rather than reduce it. See Zelenay, supra note 28, at 
262, 327–28 (noting the potential adverse effect of the Prescription Drug User 
Fee Act (PDUFA), which has speeded drug review times, on the U.S. public’s 
health).  
 46. TASK FORCE ON RISK MGMT., supra note 45, at 34.  
 47. Zaina P. Qureshi et al., Market Withdrawal of New Molecular Entities 
Approved in the United States from 1980 to 2009, 20 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY 
& DRUG SAFETY 772, 775 tbl.3 (2011); see also Amalia M. Issa et al., Drug 
Withdrawals in the United States: A Systematic Review of the Evidence and 
Analysis of Trends, 2 CURRENT DRUG SAFETY 177, 179 tbl.1 (2007) (providing 
approval and withdrawal dates for twenty drugs withdrawn between 1993 and 
2006 that are mostly but not entirely consistent with those provided by 
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concerned with the reasons for withdrawal and not the timing, 
the approval and withdrawal dates they identified for these 
thirty drugs can be used to determine the duration each drug 
was on the market. The following chart was accordingly con-
structed to illustrate how soon after approval these drugs were 
withdrawn. 
 
FIGURE 1: New Molecular Entity Withdrawals by Years 
Since Approval, 1980–2009 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that one in five drugs (20%) was withdrawn 
for safety reasons within the first year following approval, and 
slightly more than half (53%) were withdrawn within five years 
of approval. These figures support the conventional notion that 
newly approved drugs are more likely to be withdrawn for safe-
ty reasons, if at all, within the first several years following ap-
proval.48
 
Qureshi et al., with the differences possibly reflecting differing methodology 
and sources consulted).  
 Nevertheless, the long tail of the withdrawal curve al-
so indicates that even somewhat older drugs may still be 
subject to withdrawal for safety reasons. Crowdsourcing, as de-
scribed infra, can help address the risks flowing from both of 
these phenomena by increasing awareness of risks during the 
early years and by improving data capture so that dangerous 
drugs can be identified and removed from the market more 
quickly.  
 48. Qureshi et al. report that about 75% of discontinued drugs were with-
drawn for what appear to be financial or commercial reasons, rather than 
safety. Qureshi et al., supra note 47, at 776.  
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C. INFORMED CONSENT 
It may be unavoidable to test a drug on the public following 
appropriately thorough clinical trials. Knowledge of a drug is, 
after all, never absolutely complete.49 It is irresponsible, how-
ever, to collect post approval data in the ad hoc manner cur-
rently in place, in which it is well known that most serious ad-
verse events go unreported, not to mention less serious ones.50 
More importantly, the impossibility of absolute and compre-
hensive knowledge is not an excuse for conducting this post-
approval human testing without obtaining the public’s in-
formed consent.51 It is entirely within the realm of feasibility to 
ensure that the public more clearly understands the risks in-
volved in consuming drugs and particularly the uncertainties 
that inevitably accompany the most recently-approved drugs.52
Both national and international law prohibit testing on 
human subjects unless those subjects voluntarily consent after 
being informed of the likely risks and benefits of the research. 
The Nuremberg Code of 1947, which was drafted following 
egregious ethical violations that occurred at the hands of cer-
tain Nazi physicians, declares that “[t]he voluntary consent of 
the human subject is absolutely essential.”
  
53 Two decades later, 
the World Medical Association adopted the Declaration of Hel-
sinki, which (as amended) provides that “[p]articipation by . . . 
subjects in medical research must be voluntary” and that “each 
potential subject must be adequately informed of . . . the antici-
pated benefits and potential risks of the study.”54
 
 49. See id. at 776–77 (discussing the importance of continuous testing 
throughout the product’s life cycle). 
 In the United 
 50. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing methods of obtaining adverse effects 
post-approval).  
 51. See JILL A. FISHER, MEDICAL RESEARCH FOR HIRE: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 25 (2009) (describing ethical 
norms for medical testing). 
 52. See Bruce. E. Onofrey, From Molecule to Medicine Cabinet: A Drug’s 
Long Journey from Development to Approval, REV. OPTOMETRY, June 15, 2013, 
at 30 (describing a black box warning). 
 53. 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRI-
BUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 181 (U.S. Gov’t Printing 
Office 1949). The principles now known as the Nuremberg Code were first in-
cluded in the judicial decision of the so-called “Doctor’s Trial,” and are availa-
ble at http://ori.dhhs.gov/education/products/RCRintro/c03/b1c3.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 25, 2013).  
 54. WMA, supra note 16, ¶¶ 22, 24; see also International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 172 (“[N]o one 
shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimen-
tation.”); COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORGS. OF MED. SCI., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL 
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States, a portion of the Code of Federal Regulations known as 
the “Common Rule” prohibits human testing “unless the inves-
tigator has obtained the legally effective informed consent of 
the subject.”55
Under current law and practice, however, the “human test-
ing” (which term is rarely used) that follows FDA approval has 
traditionally escaped the confining strictures of human subject 
research on the apparent basis that the drug has been formally 
tested as much as is practicable, and that the discovery of ad-
verse events via legally-required monitoring does not constitute 
human subject research at all.
 These laws and international instruments create 
baseline norms that help to protect people from being unknow-
ingly or unwillingly exposed to the risks that accompany exper-
imental medical treatments. 
56 Therefore, the informed con-
sent principles of the Nuremberg Code, Declaration of Helsinki, 
and Common Rule are not applied.57 From the perspective of 
the pharmaceutical company, this distinction is sensible. Fol-
lowing FDA approval, attention turns from clinical trials to 
producing and selling.58 With the exception of Phase 4 studies, 
the post-approval period has no clinical trial sites, principal in-
vestigators, clinical research associates (monitors), or clinical 
report forms.59
 
GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS, at 
guideline 4 (3d ed. 2002), available at http://www.fhi360.org/resource/ 
international-ethical-guidelines-biomedical-research-involving-human 
-subjects (“Individual Informed Consent”). 
 Adverse event reports are almost an after-
thought. From the perspective of the prescribing practitioner, 
as well, considering the administration of newly approved 
drugs to be “research” makes little sense. The primary purpose 
 55. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2012); see also 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2013) (containing 
the analogous FDA provision regarding informed consent of human subjects). 
The Common Rule derives its name from the fact that it applies broadly across 
federal agencies. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101; FISHER, supra note 51, at 28.  
 56. See generally Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,193 (Apr. 18, 
1979) (finding it “important to distinguish between biomedical and behavioral 
research, on the one hand, and the practice of accepted therapy on the other, 
in order to know what activities ought to undergo review for the protection of 
human subjects of research,” but also acknowledging that “[t]he distinction 
between research and practice is blurred partly because both often occur to-
gether”). 
 57. See id. (noting the difficulty in distinguishing between practice and 
research). 
 58. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.84 (2013) (discussing marketing applications). 
 59. Phase 4 studies are post-approval studies requested by the FDA that 
seek to provide additional information about a drug’s risks, benefits, and op-
timal use. See id. § 312.85. 
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of post-approval administration of new drugs is treatment, not 
data gathering.60 Patients are not “enrolled” in a clinical trial, 
nor are they randomized such that some receive only placebo.61
From the patient perspective, however, these differences 
are illusory. The relevant concern to the patient is the level of 
risk that remains in the pill that they are taking, balanced 
against the likely benefit.
  
62 It matters little whether the risk is 
undertaken and data is collected under the label of a “clinical 
trial” or under the “normal care” of a physician.63 Both involve 
the administration of a substance by a healthcare provider to a 
patient where uncertain risks and benefits remain.64 The ab-
sence of an enrollment protocol or informed consent procedure 
merely obscures the fact that there is still uncertainty with re-
spect to the substance in question.65 The difference of placebo 
control is also not as great as it first appears, in part because 
some clinical trials do not use placebo controls.66 Even where 
placebo controls are used, many patients do not adequately ap-
preciate that the primary purpose of the clinical trial is not to 
treat them or that they may receive no treatment at all.67 As 
with drugs undergoing pre-approval clinical testing, post-
approval “testing” involves incomplete information, risks to the 
patient, and the collection of data based on patient outcomes 
that will be collected, considered, and used to benefit future pa-
tients.68
 
 60. See id. § 312.84 (approving drugs when need for treatment outweighs 
potential risks). 
  
 61. Shockingly, a recent study found that “[a]bout half of the [surveyed 
physicians] reported prescribing placebo treatments . . . on a regular basis.” 
Jon C. Tilburt et al., Prescribing “Placebo Treatments”: Results of National 
Survey of US Internists and Rheumatologists, 337 BRITISH MED. J. a1938, *3 
(2008), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2572204/ 
pdf/bmj.a1938.pdf. The ethics of such prescribing practices are addressed 
elsewhere. See, e.g., Howard Brody, The Lie that Heals: The Ethics of Giving 
Placebos, 97 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 112 (1982); Sissela Bok, The Ethics of 
Giving Placebos, 231 SCI. AM., Nov. 1974, at 17, 17–18.  
 62. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.84. 
 63. See Onofrey, supra note 52, at 26, 30. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Cf. Qureshi et al., supra note 47, at 776 (finding twenty-five percent of 
studied drugs were discontinued for safety reasons after FDA approval). 
 66. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(iii)–(iv). 
 67. See Jill A. Fisher, Procedural Misconceptions and Informed Consent: 
Insights from Empirical Research on the Clinical Trials Industry, 16 KENNEDY 
INST. ETHICS J. 251, 256–57 (2006).  
 68. See infra Part II.C. 
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D. CONSENT TO TREATMENT 
Although the informed consent guidelines may not apply to 
post-approval administration of new drugs, this does not mean 
that patients are entirely without protection. Under an array of 
legal theories, patients cannot be treated until they provide ad-
equate informed consent, known as “consent to treatment.”69 
Patients injured as a result of newly approved medications can 
bring suits against the physician based upon theories of negli-
gence, assault and battery, and misrepresentation, among oth-
ers.70
The potential theories of liability, however, are governed 
by a patchwork of state statutory and common laws, and ac-
tions based upon them are not especially common.
  
71 In general, 
however, the elements needed to establish a case of failure to 
obtain consent to treatment are: “(1) the existence of a material 
risk unknown to the patient; (2) the failure of the defendant to 
disclose the risk; (3) the probable refusal of the patient to un-
dergo the proposed treatment, had the risk been disclosed; and 
(4) resulting injury to the patient.”72 The relatively few cases 
involving pharmaceuticals that have emerged have often, 
though not always, found one of these elements to be lacking. 
For example, in Carmichael v. Reitz, a patient sued her doctor 
on the basis of lack of informed consent after an endometriosis 
drug prescribed by the doctor caused pulmonary embolisms.73
 
 69. See generally FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTI-
CAL GUIDE (4th ed. 2012) (describing the basic rules of consent to treatment). 
 
The California appeals court found the third element lacking, 
noting that there was “no substantial evidence” that the patient 
would have refused treatment if a full explanation of risks had 
 70. See id. § 1.01[D]. 
 71. See Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 758 A.2d 1238, 1245 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 2000) (“[A]ppellate courts have declined to extend the doctrine [of in-
formed consent] to include the administration of drugs . . . .”); Gerald F. Tietz, 
Informed Consent in the Prescription Drug Context: The Special Case, 61 
WASH. L. REV. 367, 367 (1986) (“Medical patients rarely bring suit against 
prescribing physicians on an informed consent theory in the context of pre-
scription drug therapy.”); see also Albert Averbach, Physician’s Liability for 
Prescription Drugs, 43 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 535, 554 (1969) (“It is a rare occur-
rence that a physician will be found liable for the administration of a drug 
which seemed reasonable in the light of foresight, although disastrous in 
terms of hindsight.”). 
 72. Lauren Krohn, Cause of Action Against Physician for Negligence in 
Prescribing Drugs or Medicines, in 9 CAUSES OF ACTION 1, 17 (Wesley H. 
Winborne et al. eds., 1986).  
 73. Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 966 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).  
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been given.74 In another case, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts overturned a jury’s $1 million award for failure 
to obtain informed consent for treatment with prednisone, hold-
ing that there was insufficient evidence to show “that the phy-
sician knew or reasonably should have known that the proba-
bility [the] particular risk [in question] would materialize was 
other than negligible.”75
Other cases suggest that plaintiffs who are not adequately 
informed of prescription drug risks may sometimes have a via-
ble cause of action. For example, in Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, a 
plaintiff was awarded $357,000 after a pharmacist negligently 
failed to warn him of risks accompanying the drug trazodone.
 
76 
Similarly, an alleged failure to obtain a patient’s informed con-
sent to treatment with prednisone was found to create a genu-
ine issue of material fact in light of disagreement over what in-
formation was actually disclosed.77 Although these cases 
resulted in an outcome favorable to the plaintiff, they involve 
the failure to communicate known risks, and do not speak to a 
failure to communicate the uncertainty and generalized risks 
that remain when newly approved prescription drugs are re-
leased on the market.78
Despite a small number of plaintiff-favorable cases, the 
general attitude of the courts toward informed consent in the 
context of prescription drugs has been one of deference to the 
medical profession.
  
79 Past judicial treatment of informed con-
sent has been described as creating “excessive paternalism” 
and granting doctors “effective immunity” from liability.80
 
 74. Id. at 968–69. While a lack of causation may justify the denial of lia-
bility, it does not resolve the ethical shortcoming created when a failure to 
transmit risk information prevents the patient from facing those risks volun-
tarily and on a fully informed basis. See Krohn, supra note 
 The 
72, at 19 (discuss-
ing that it is easier to bring a claim under a theory of lack of informed consent 
than negligence).  
 75. Precourt v. Frederick, 481 N.E.2d 1144, 1149–50 (Mass. 1985). 
 76. Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 764 N.E.2d 814, 817–18, 823 (Mass. 2002). 
The claims against the physicians were settled prior to trial. Id. at 817. 
 77. Mercado-Velilla v. Asociacion Hosp. del Maestro, 902 F. Supp. 2d 217, 
227 (D.P.R. 2012).  
 78. See Hernandez v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1076 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009) (“Physicians have a duty to inform their patients of the known 
risks . . . associated with proposed treatments.” (emphasis added)); Dunn v. 
Yager, 58 So. 3d 1171, 1200 (Miss. 2011) (“[T]he physician must disclose only 
material known risks.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 79. See, e.g., Precourt, 481 N.E.2d at 1149–50. 
 80. Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between 
Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 367 (2002).  
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Illinois Supreme Court’s view with respect to drug risk disclo-
sures is representative: “The doctor, functioning as a learned 
intermediary between the prescription drug manufacturer and 
the patient, decides which available drug best fits the patient’s 
needs and chooses which facts from the various warnings 
should be conveyed to the patient, and the extent of disclosure is 
a matter of medical judgment.”81 This wide latitude provided to 
doctors by courts has been aptly criticized by one commentator 
as “[e]xtreme deference to the medical profession.”82 Another 
pointed out the natural consequence of this deference: “Many 
physicians choose not to disclose all the risks involved with the 
use of a medication, or any treatment, reasoning that a pa-
tient’s knowledge of such information is not needed for a pa-
tient’s informed consent.”83
Given the rarity of suits based upon lack of informed con-
sent and the absence of rigorous policing by courts of informed 
consent to treatment, it is no surprise that actual disclosures to 
patients are minimal.
 If physicians do not consider risk 
information important enough to disclose to a patient, efficacy 
information is even less likely to be disclosed. 
84
The history of the physician-patient relationship from ancient times 
to the present bears testimony to physicians’ caring dedication to 
their patients’ physical welfare. The same history, by its account of 
the silence that has pervaded this relationship, also bears testimony 
to physicians’ inattention to their patients’ right and need to make 
their own decisions. Little appreciation of disclosure and consent can 
be discerned in this history . . . .
 When it comes to prescription drugs, 
“treatment consent” is a lofty concept that rapidly descends to 
lip service in practice. In his book The Silent World of Doctor 
and Patient, Jay Katz notes:  
85
The FDA has also expressed concern with the absence of 
robust consent procedures for drugs, noting in particular the 
oddity that “simple surgical procedures, often posing less se-
vere risks to the patient [than medications], routinely require 
detailed patient consent,” while the administration of medica-
tions involves minimal consent procedures and “little or no” in-
 
 
 81. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387, 393 (1987) 
(emphasis added). 
 82. Tietz, supra note 71, at 395.  
 83. Elizabeth C. Melby, The Psychological Manipulation of the Consumer-
Patient Population Through Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertis-
ing, 5 SCHOLAR 325, 332 (2003).  
 84. See Tietz, supra note 71, at 367. 
 85. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 28 (1984). 
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formation exchange.86 Steven Joffe and Robert Truog of Har-
vard Medical School add that a “more deliberate and thorough 
consent process” may be in order where the risks of treatment 
must be balanced against the risks of non-treatment.87 In the 
vaccine context, one commentator notes that the law may lead 
physicians to not involve patients in the decision making pro-
cess.88
The absence of robust information exchange in the doctor-
patient relationship is fueled by the hierarchical relationship 
between doctors and patients and the associated expectation 
that the doctor’s role is to decide, while the patient’s role is to 
trust.
  
89 To borrow the title of a popular book, when it comes to 
substantive discussions of the possible risks and benefits of im-
pending treatments, physicians today are “Strangers at the 
Bedside.”90
E. INFORMED CONSENT IS NOT THE ONLY PROBLEM: EFFICACY 
AND COST ISSUES 
  
Continued safety risks are not the only concern when new 
drugs are released on the market. Many new drugs also suffer 
from a lack of substantial efficacy.91 This is not to say that new 
drugs are completely ineffective, though occasionally that may 
later be revealed to be the case.92
 
 86. FDA Prescription Drug Product Labeling; Medication Guide Require-
ments, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,182–83 (Aug. 24, 1995).  
 More often, however, a drug 
either is simply not very effective in treating its stated indica-
tions, or it is not any more effective (and possibly less effective) 
 87. Steven Joffe & Robert D. Truog, Consent to Medical Care: The Im-
portance of Fiduciary Context, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 369 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010). 
 88. Daniel A. Cantor, Comment, Striking a Balance Between Product 
Availability and Product Safety: Lessons from the Vaccine Act, 44 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1853, 1868–69 (1995). 
 89. See Janet L. Dolgin, Debating Conflicts: Medicine, Commerce, and 
Contrasting Ethical Orders, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 705, 711–12 (2006).  
 90. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW 
LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 1–2 (1991).  
 91. See Jonathan J. Darrow, Pharmaceutical Efficacy: History and Regu-
lation (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on file with au-
thor). 
 92. See, e.g., FDA Commissioner Removes Breast Cancer Indication from 
Avastin Label, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/ 
NewsEvents/Newsroom/ucm279485.htm (announcing the agency’s revocation 
of breast cancer indication for Avastin due to its failure “to provide a benefit, 
in terms of delay in the growth of tumors, that would justify its serious and 
potentially life-threatening risks”).  
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than existing treatments.93 The absence of substantial efficacy 
for newly FDA-approved drugs is entirely legal under United 
States law, which requires only that the evidence of efficacy be 
substantial.94 This is known as the “substantial evidence” 
standard, and usually requires that drug sponsors submit at 
least two “adequate and well-controlled investigations.”95 How-
ever, there is no requirement that the efficacy itself be substan-
tial.96 So long as two adequate and well-controlled studies 
demonstrate statistically significant improvement over placebo, 
a drug can be approved whether it provides 99% relief, 50% re-
lief, or 1% relief.97
Moreover, there is no requirement that the level of efficacy 
be clearly communicated to either consumers or physicians.
  
98 
As a consequence, studies have shown that consumers overes-
timate drug efficacy by 1000% (one thousand percent) or more.99 
Physicians, trusted by patients to be experts who know more 
than they do about the drugs that they take, nevertheless pre-
scribe billions of dollars of these underwhelmingly potent drugs 
per year.100
Worse still, the vapid drug efficacy standard contributes 
both directly and substantially to the high cost of the new 
drugs that are produced. This relationship between drug cost 
and drug efficacy can be explained mathematically, in relative-
ly simple terms: The smaller the difference in efficacy between 
a new drug and a placebo, the larger the data set needed to es-
  
 
 93. See, e.g., Irving Kirsch & Guy Sapirstein, Listening to Prozac but 
Hearing Placebo: A Meta-Analysis of Antidepressant Medication, 1 PREVEN-
TION & TREATMENT Article 2a (1998) (estimating that seventy-five percent of 
the response to active antidepressant medication can be attributed to the pla-
cebo effect); John Carey, Vytorin: A Setback for Merck and Schering, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 22, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
stories/2008-07-22/vytorin-a-setback-for-merck-and-scheringbusinessweek 
-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice (“The trial showed no bene-
fit at all to the drug combination, compared with a statin alone.”). 
 94. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012). 
 95. Id.; Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(“Because the Act uses the plural ‘investigations,’ the FDA requires drug 
manufacturers to submit at least two ‘adequate and well-controlled’ studies 
showing the effectiveness of the drug.”). 
 96. See 21 U.S.C. § 355. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id.  
 99. See, e.g., Lisa M. Schwartz et al., Using a Drug Facts Box to Com-
municate Drug Benefits and Harms, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 516, 524 
(2009).  
 100. See DARROW, supra note 91. 
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tablish that efficacy with the requisite p=.05 level of certain-
ty.101 A larger data set means larger or longer clinical trials,102 
and clinical trials contribute the largest component of the cost 
of new drugs, approximately 50% by most estimates.103 This in-
verse relationship between cost and efficacy level creates a sit-
uation where the least effective drugs will require the largest 
and most expensive trials.104 These clinical trials’ costs, as a 
component of “research and development costs,” are often used 
to justify the high consumer prices of the drugs that result.105
II.  CROWDSOURCING AS A SOLUTION TO THE ETHICAL 
PROBLEM, AND OTHER BENEFITS   
 
There are a number of possible solutions to the safety and 
efficacy challenges that remain following FDA approval of new 
drugs. For example, the FDA could require even larger Phase 3 
studies as a means to detect rare adverse events. To guard 
against minimally efficacious drugs, Congress might enact min-
imum standards for efficacy itself, supplementing current 
standards that address only the amount and quality of evidence 
 
 101. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CLINICAL 
TRIALS 148 (4th ed. 2010) (“[T]he smaller the difference in intervention ef-
fect . . . the larger the study must be.”).  
 102. See Donner, supra note 9, at 199. 
 103. KEWAL K. JAIN, THE HANDBOOK OF BIOMARKERS 107 (2010) 
(“[C]linical trials . . . account for approximately 60% of the total drug develop-
ment costs.”); Samiran Nundy et al., A New Colonialism?—Conducting Clini-
cal Trials in India, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1633, 1634 (2005) (“[D]rug trials . . . 
can run to 40 percent of the cost of drug development.”); Peter Lansbury, An 
Innovative Drug Industry? Well, No, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2003, at B2 (“Phase 
3 trials account for roughly 50 percent of the total cost of bringing a drug to 
market.”). 
 104. Other scholars have noted similarly perverse behavior in the pharma-
ceuticals sector, such as the “inverse benefit law,” which holds that “the ratio 
of benefits to harms among patients taking new drugs tends to vary inversely 
with how extensively the drugs are marketed.” Howard Brody & Donald W. 
Light, The Inverse Benefit Law: How Drug Marketing Undermines Patient 
Safety and Public Health, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 399, 399 (2011). 
 105. See, e.g., Carmelo Giaccotto et al., Drug Prices and Research and De-
velopment Investment Behavior in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 48 J.L. & 
ECON. 195, 195–96, 212 (2005) (“[D]rug prices are expected to influence R & D 
spending directly . . . . [O]ur multiple-regression findings support this ex-
pected direct effect.”); PUB. CITIZEN, RX R&D MYTHS: THE CASE AGAINST THE 
DRUG INDUSTRY’S R&D “SCARE CARD” 1 (2001), available at http://www.citizen 
.org/documents/ACFDC.PDF (“The central claim of PhRMA’s campaign is om-
inous: if anything is done to restrain high U.S. prescription drug prices, then 
research and development (R & D) to find new drugs for life-threatening dis-
eases will suffer.”).  
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of that efficacy.106 However, any objective standard with respect 
to efficacy beyond statistical significance would necessarily be 
somewhat arbitrary, and even the largest Phase 3 studies will 
not be able to detect extremely rare adverse events that only 
become apparent when the entire relevant consumer popula-
tion is given access to the drug in question.107
A. WHAT IS CROWDSOURCING? 
 That is, of course, 
unless one is willing to turn the entire relevant consumer popu-
lation into a “Phase 4 study.” The current proposal involves us-
ing a crowdsourcing model to do just that.  
In order to evaluate the feasibility of crowdsourcing as a 
means of collecting relevant post-approval drug data, it is help-
ful to understand what “crowdsourcing” is. The term itself was 
coined in a 2006 Wired magazine article as a variation on “out-
sourcing,” but where businesses look not to an outside company 
to perform a task but to some nebulous “crowd” of people.108 
Since then, its meaning has evolved to describe a number of dif-
ferent, but related phenomena that utilize the power of a dis-
tributed group of people to achieve a given result.109 For exam-
ple, crowdsourcing might involve the contribution of dispersed 
individuals working asynchronously to build and refine a uni-
fied product, as with open source software like Linux and 
Apache.110
 
 106. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012).  
 Alternately, it could involve offering a prize to the 
public at large for the first or best solution to a specific prob-
 107. See Berlin et al., supra note 2, at 1366; Margaret Gilhooley, Commer-
cial Speech, Drugs, Promotion and a Tailored Advertisement Moratorium, 21 
HEALTH MATRIX 97, 97 (2011).  
 108. Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED, June 2006, at 177. 
 109. See, e.g., Julie D. Polovina, Mutant Biologics: The 2010 Health-Reform 
Legislation’s Potential Impact on Reducing Biologic Research and Development 
Costs, 100 GEO. L.J. 2291, 2310 (2012) (“‘[C]rowdsourcing’ is defined as com-
panies ‘outsourcing’ tasks historically done by employees to the general public 
to take advantage of a free and large labor pool.”); Sarah Cove, What Does 
Crowdsourcing Really Mean?, WIRED, July 12, 2007, http://www.wired.com/ 
techbiz/media/news/2007/07/crowdsourcing?currentPage=all (describing 
crowdsourcing as a “kind of industrial age, corporatist framing of a cultural 
phenomenon”); Jeff Howe, Crowdsourcing: A Definition, CROWDSOURCING, 
http://www.crowdsourcing.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2013) (“Crowdsourcing is 
the act of taking a job traditionally performed by a designated agent (usually 
an employee) and outsourcing it to an undefined, generally large group of peo-
ple in the form of an open call.”).  
 110. See Richard F. Heller et al., Capacity-building for Public Health: 
http://peoples-uni.org, 85 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 930, 931 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/12/07-044388.pdf. 
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lem, as when the British government in 1714 established a 
prize for whomever could solve the very practical problem of de-
termining longitude at sea,111 or when Netflix more recently of-
fered a prize to whomever could improve its film recommenda-
tion system.112
In fact, the past several years have witnessed the success 
of a surprisingly broad array of crowdsourcing models. In Fort 
Myers, Florida, a local news service used the contributions of 
individuals to unmoderated discussion boards to help investi-
gate local sewer and water rate hikes that were widely per-
ceived to be unjust.
 
113 In another case, a business called 
iStockphoto revolutionized the stock photo market by 
crowdsourcing digital images from more than 20,000 contribu-
tors, undercutting the existing market in price by as much as 
99%.114 Distributed computing such as SETI@home aggregates 
the excess capacity of millions of idle computers to perform use-
ful functions.115 Individualized technical challenges have been 
partially crowdsourced, such as the performance of computer 
help-desk functions at a state university.116 The majority of 
iPhone applications are developed not by Apple, the maker of 
the iPhone, but by unrelated developers who work inde-
pendently to create many of the hundreds of thousands of ap-
plications that are then aggregated by Apple and made availa-
ble for sale through its App Store.117
 
 111. See Following the Crowd, ECONOMIST, TECH. Q., Sept. 4, 2008, http:// 
www.economist.com/node/11999251. 
  
 112. See Steve Lohr, The Crowd Is Wise (When It’s Focused), N.Y. TIMES, 
July 19, 2009, at BU4. 
 113. Steve Fox, Looking to Crowdsource? Better Have a Dog in the Race, 
NEWASSIGNMENT.NET (Nov. 9, 2006, 11:04 AM), http://web-archive-net.com/ 
page/1580579/2013-03-10/http://newassignment.net/blog/steve_fox/nov2006/09/ 
a_gannett_silo_i.   
 114. Howe, supra note 108, at 178. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Jeffrey R. Young, Colleges Try “Crowdsourcing” Help Desks to Save 
Money, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 6, 2009, at A1.  
 117. See Ann Bartow, A Portrait of the Internet as a Young Man, 108 MICH. 
L. REV. 1079, 1101 (2010) (“[T]ens of thousands of applications have subse-
quently been independently developed for the iPhone . . . .”); Chris Foresman, 
IOS App Success Is a “Lottery”: 60% (or More) of Developers Don’t Break Even, 
ARS TECHNICA (May 4, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/apple/2012/05/ 
ios-app-success-is-a-lottery-and-60-of-developers-dont-break-even (noting that 
Apple facilitates the process of application development and distribution by 
granting would-be developers access to Apple’s developer program for $99 per 
year). 
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B. CROWDSOURCING OF CLINICAL TRIALS: THE MODEL IN BRIEF 
Crowdsourcing as a solution to the ethical and other prob-
lems described in Part II is relatively straightforward, involv-
ing the Internet-based collection of data during the post-
approval period. There would be no need to alter the FDA ap-
proval process until the point of approval. During the pre-
approval period, pharmaceutical companies would continue to 
proceed through the preclinical period and phased clinical trial 
period as under current practice. When safety and efficacy in-
formation reaches a suitable threshold, however, the FDA 
would grant only a conditional approval, which would remain 
conditional until sufficient information was collected via the 
crowdsourcing platform.  
Patients would be made aware of the conditional nature of 
the approval through, for example, the use of a symbol indicat-
ing that the drug is newly approved. This symbol, possibly 
along with other signals and warnings, would help to ensure 
that patients understand the uncertainty that accompanies 
new drugs. Critically, patients would also be encouraged to par-
ticipate in an online data gathering platform that would allow 
them to enter feedback about the drug, essentially inviting the 
entire patient population to contribute to an uncontrolled 
Phase 4 study. This online crowdsourcing platform would not 
only gather data and in return provide useful aggregated data 
to the patient, but also would itself serve as an unmistakable 
signal to patients that safety and efficacy information about the 
drug was still being gathered. These elements of conditional 
approval and post-approval crowdsourcing are examined in 
greater detail below.  
1. Conditional Approval and Product Marking 
By appropriate statutory amendment, the FDA could be 
granted the power to “conditionally approve” drugs following 
Phase 3 testing. Patients taking the drug during a certain peri-
od following this conditional approval could be explicitly in-
formed of the conditional nature of the approval and the uncer-
tainty that remains. Uncertainty could be communicated in 
various ways, such as requiring patients to sign a consent form, 
or placing special markings or “pink caps” (or some other color) 
on the prescription bottles or other packaging during this peri-
od. A system by which colored caps or other symbols are used to 
warn patients and healthcare providers of the risks of new 
drugs has already proved its feasibility in the United Kingdom, 
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where an inverted black triangle has long been used to denote 
the risks associated with newly approved drugs.118 Unfortunate-
ly, the British black triangle system has in the past not been 
well understood even within that country’s medical profession 
and therefore has not been particularly effective.119 One team of 
researchers, for example, reported that “few doctors in the 
United Kingdom know the meaning of the ‘black triangle’ sys-
tem,” and found that underreporting of adverse events with re-
spect to black triangle drugs remained a problem.120 Another 
noted that doctors in England had prescribed Vioxx to 42,000 
patients, despite the appearance of the black triangle on that 
product.121
Nevertheless, these shortcomings likely reflect the system’s 
implementation rather than its potential, and in 2007 an ex-
pert committee under contract from the Department of Health 
and Human Services recommended that the U.S. import a sys-
tem similar to the U.K. model to the United States.
  
122 In its re-
port, the committee “recommend[ed] that Congress amend the 
FD&C Act to require that product labels carry a special symbol 
such as the black triangle used in the United Kingdom or an 
equivalent symbol for new drugs, new combinations of active 
substances, and new systems of delivery of existing drugs.”123 
Later the same year, Congress responded by instructing the 
FDA to submit to Congress a report on how best to communi-
cate to the public the risks and benefits of new drugs, including 
possible consideration of the use of a unique new drug symbol 
on labeling and in advertising.124
 
 118. See Richard M. Martin et al., Underreporting of Suspected Adverse 
Drug Reactions to Newly Marketed (“Black Triangle”) Drugs in General Prac-
tice: Observational Study, 317 BRIT. MED. J. 119, 119 (1998); Black Triangle 
Scheme—New Medicines and Vaccines Subject to EU-wide Additional Monitor-
ing, MEDS. & HEALTHCARE PRODS. REG. AGENCY, http://www.mhra.gov.uk/ 
Safetyinformation/Howwemonitorthesafetyofproducts/Medicines/ 
BlackTriangleproducts/index.htm#l1 (last modified Nov. 18, 2013) (explaining 
the black triangle scheme as a “system to identify medicines that are being 
monitored particularly closely by regulatory authorities”).  
  
 119. See Martin et al., supra note 118.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Paul A. Dieppe et al., Lessons from the Withdrawal of Rofecoxib, 329 
BRIT. MED. J. 867, 868 (2004).  
 122. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: 
PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 171 (Alina Baciu et 
al. eds., 2007). 
 123. Id.  
 124. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-85, § 904, 121 Stat. 823 (2007) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
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Unfortunately, the resulting 2009 report rejected the use of 
a special symbol and instead favored listing the initial year of 
approval in the Highlights section of the healthcare profession-
al labeling.125 Although listing the approval year provides 
greater information than a symbol—physicians and consumers 
can easily calculate the time a drug has been on the market—
its significance is unlikely to be appreciated by patients. Even if 
patients read the Highlights section of the physician labeling 
and see the year of approval, they are unlikely to understand 
that it is a flag of possible increased risk. In 2013, the Europe-
an Commission came to a different conclusion, adopting a regu-
lation that expands the use of the inverted black triangle 
throughout the European Union.126
Labeling is not the only place where a special symbol can 
increase awareness of risk. Advertisements for new drugs could 
also be required to include whatever symbol is chosen as a 
warning indicator for new drugs, and to disclose to viewers the 
meaning of this symbol. The advertisements might also be re-
 Future research might 
measure consumer and physician comprehension of risk under 
these two contrasting systems.  
 
of 21 U.S.C.); H.R. REP. NO. 110-937, at 80–82 (2009) (noting the Institute of 
Medicine’s findings that the FDA and pharmaceutical industry do not make 
safety concerns transparent to the public in a timely, effective manner). The 
FDA had earlier considered and rejected the black triangle system. See Dis-
cussion Drafts Concerning Prescription Drug User Fee Act Reauthorization, 
Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act Reauthorization, Drug Safety, 
and Certain Pediatric Pharmaceutical and Device Legislation: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th 
Cong. 87 (2009) (statement of Caroline Loew, Senior Vice President, PhRMA) 
(“FDA considered a similar requirement in December 2000—a black triangle 
on new drugs for three years following approval—and, following a five-year 
public stakeholder process, abandoned the idea on the ground that the triangle 
would not be ‘universally understood, could be confusing to the prescriber 
(even with a concerted educational effort) and therefore may not serve its in-
tended purposes.’” (quoting 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3936–37 (Jan. 24, 2006) (as cod-
ified in 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601))). 
 125. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS: FDA AMENDMENTS ACT 
OF 2007 SECTION 904: COMMUNICATING TO THE PUBLIC ON THE RISKS AND 
BENEFITS OF NEW DRUGS 15–16 (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosmetic 
ActFDCAct/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/FoodandDrug 
AdministrationAmendmentsActof2007/FDAAAImplementationChart/ 
UCM267478.pdf.  
 126. Commission Implementing Regulation 198/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 65) 17, 
17–18 (EU); see also Commission Regulation 1027/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 316) 38, 
39 (EU) (requiring a “black symbol” for drugs that are subject to additional 
monitoring); Commission Regulation 1235/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 348) 1, 8 (EU) 
(same). 
  
2014] CROWDSOURCING CLINICAL TRIALS 829 
 
quired to disclose “the date the drug was approved and that the 
existing information may not have identified or allowed for full 
assessment of all serious risks of using the drug,” to borrow 
language from a proposed 2007 bill that did not pass.127
Nowhere is the need for better disclosure more evident 
than in the case of Vioxx. If patients had been informed that 
Vioxx was no more effective than ibuprofen or Advil (naprox-
en)—and convincing, independent meta-studies have shown 
that it is not
 Alter-
nately or additionally, doctors could be encouraged via the 
promulgation of guidelines to simply inform patients at the 
time of prescribing: “This is a new drug that has been condi-
tionally approved by the FDA in [year], and there is always 
some uncertainty and risk right after a drug is placed on the 
market.” If oral warnings and special symbols are judged insuf-
ficient, patients might be required to sign a brief consent form 
acknowledging awareness of the date the drug was approved 
and the fact that unknown risks may remain despite condition-
al approval.  
128—and that as a new drug it carried some un-
known and unknowable risk,129 many of the tens of millions of 
patients who took the drug during the five years it was on the 
market (1999–2004)130 may well have opted for the older, time-
tested medications. However, they were not so informed,131
 
 127. Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act, H.R. 1561, 110th Cong., 
§ 101(o)(4)(G)(i)(I) (2007). First Amendment concerns, especially over certain 
“moratorium” provisions that would have allowed the FDA to prohibit adver-
tising entirely for up to three years after drug approval, eventually contribut-
ed to the bill’s defeat. See Mark I. Schwartz, To Ban or Not to Ban—That Is 
the Question: The Constitutionality of a Moratorium on Consumer Drug Adver-
tising, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 3 (2008).  
 and 
as a result it is estimated that at least 26,400 people died in the 
 128. ROGER CHOU ET AL., OR. EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE CTR., COMPARA-
TIVE EFFECTIVENESS AND SAFETY OF ANALGESICS FOR OSTEOARTHRITIS 3–4 
(2006), available at http://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/repFiles/ 
AnalgesicsFinal.pdf. 
 129. See Berlin et al., supra note 2, at 1366–67.  
 130. Berenson, supra note 33, at A25.  
 131. FDA, Merck, and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong. 14 (2004), at 13 (statement of David J. 
Graham, Associate Director for Science, Office of Drug Safety, Food and Drug 
Administration) (noting that Vioxx’s labeling initially said nothing about heart 
attack risks and when the information was added, it was not included in the 
label’s warning section).  
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United States,132
2. Crowdsourcing 
 without having the option to either accept or 
decline the new medication based on informed consent.  
Following a conditional approval by the FDA, a drug would 
be released on the market, but consumers would be directly in-
volved in contributing safety and efficacy data during the peri-
od of conditional approval. In a word, the final phase of study 
would be “crowdsourced.” Crowdsourcing has the potential not 
only to reveal adverse events more quickly but also to raise 
awareness of the risks that remain. By involving consumers di-
rectly in the study process, they will necessarily be placed on 
notice that the drug is still under study, resolving the problem 
that exists today where drugs are de facto tested on members of 
the public without their understanding or consent. In addition, 
by designing the online crowdsourcing platform in a transpar-
ent manner that aggregates patient feedback and presents it in 
a user-friendly manner, consumers could more easily become 
aware of actual drug risks and benefits. Rather than imposing 
a specific but arbitrary level of safety or efficacy that must be 
achieved in order to secure approval, the current standard of 
statistical significance could be retained with consumers in-
stead protected through improved disclosure and awareness of 
each product’s risk-benefit profile.  
There are a number of additional benefits to crowdsourcing 
the final phase of clinical trials. By involving consumers direct-
ly, wherever they happen to reside, the volume of data and the 
geographic and demographic scope of the data would expand 
dramatically, potentially revealing risks or benefits to certain 
subpopulations. The utilization of web-based software to man-
age the crowdsourcing process could allow for a certain amount 
of automation of data manipulation and analysis. By allowing 
patients to enter their own data, errors that can result from the 
lengthy, telephone-game chain of information transmission—
oral transmission from patient to physician, dictation by physi-
cian, transcription by transcriptionist, transmission to research 
center, forwarding to statistician, etc.—may be reduced.133
 
 132. Id. at 14. Dr. Graham estimated that between 88,000 to 139,000 “ex-
cess” heart attacks were caused by Vioxx, with 30% to 40% of these resulting 
in death. Id. Conservatively multiplying the lower numbers in each of these 
ranges produces 88,000 * 30% = 26,400. Significantly, these figures only repre-
sent United States deaths, but Vioxx was sold throughout the world. See Ber-
enson, supra note 
 Fi-
33, at A25. 
 133. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-68, DRUG SAFETY: 
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nally, by reducing the need for a physician or other prescriber 
in the data collection aspect of the process, which may earn for 
their site between $1600 to $20,000 per patient enrolled in a 
traditional clinical trial,134
Despite the potential benefits, the implementation of a 
crowdsourcing model faces substantial challenges. Crowdsourc-
ing might be difficult or impossible to randomize, control, and 
blind, characteristics that constitute the current gold standard 
for assessing a drug’s qualities. Any data that is collected may 
be of poor quality due to a deficiency in professional oversight 
or involvement. Consumers may simply lack access to an Inter-
net connection. Legal obstacles, such as the lack of clear au-
thorization for the FDA to establish such a system,
 there is a the potential for substan-
tial and much needed cost reduction. 
135
In short, if crowdsourcing clinical trials is to be viable, it 
must not only overcome these and other challenges, but also of-
fer greater value than existing protocols. The remainder of this 
Article further develops the possible contours of a crowdsourc-
ing model both by comparing and contrasting it with existing 
post-market programs and by exploring and responding to fore-
seeable arguments against its implementation.  
 may also 
be problematic. Practical opposition may come from consumers, 
who may be concerned about privacy or unwilling to undertake 
the risks, or from industry, which may fear losing control of an 
important component of the clinical trial process. It might be 
argued that existing models of conditional approval or post-
approval monitoring are already sufficient.  
C. CROWDSOURCING COMPARED WITH EXISTING MODELS 
The many health related organizations moving into the 
crowdsourcing space, including the clinical trial space,136
 
FDA HAS BEGUN EFFORTS TO ENHANCE POSTMARKET SAFETY, BUT ADDITION-
AL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED, at 25 (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/300/298135.pdf (“[A]utomatic processing will cut down on errors related 
to data entry . . . .”); infra Part III.A (responding to challenges over the data 
quality and methodological reliability of crowdsourcing as a model for Phase 4 
testing). 
 reflect 
 134. See Jill A. Fisher, Practicing Research Ethics: Private-Sector Physi-
cians & Pharmaceutical Clinical Trials, 66 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2495, 2503 
(2008).  
 135. See infra Part III.B.1 (addressing the possibility that crowdsourcing 
might not meet 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)’s requirement of “adequate and well-
controlled investigations”).  
 136. See M. Swan, Crowdsourced Health Research Studies: An Important 
Emerging Complement to Clinical Trials in the Public Health Research Ecosys-
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optimism that a distributed clinical trial model with increased 
patient input is possible. At the same time, the FDA has long 
been requesting the assistance of others as part of its programs 
to monitor drugs once released on the market.137 This monitor-
ing of pharmaceutical once in the marketplace, or 
“pharmacovigilance,”138
1. Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) 
 takes the form both of required report-
ing and voluntary submission of adverse event reports. In addi-
tion, a number of programs or policies allow early access to 
drugs with the expectation that additional information will be 
gathered later. It is worth briefly reviewing these programs to 
explore how crowdsourcing as described herein may be able to 
improve upon the status quo.  
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 
2007 authorized the FDA to require drug sponsors to submit 
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS).139 REMS 
may be required for either drugs whose approvals are pending, 
as a condition of approval, or for already-approved drugs.140
 
tem, 14 J. MED. INTERNET RES., Mar. 2012, at e46, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih 
.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3376509/. 
 The 
statutory purpose of REMS is to “ensure that the benefits of the 
 137. See, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD 
PHARMACOVIGILANCE PRACTICES AND PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGIC ASSESSMENT 
4 (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/regulatory 
information/guidances/ucm126834.pdf (“FDA recommends that sponsors make 
a reasonable attempt to obtain complete information for case assessment dur-
ing initial contacts and subsequent follow-up . . . .”). 
 138. See id. at 1. 
 139. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), 
Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 901(b), 121 Stat. 823, 926 (2007). The decision to require 
drug sponsors to submit and implement a REMS is made jointly by the Office 
of New Drugs and the Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology, whose offices 
are housed within the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(CDER). See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE OFFICE OF NEW DRUGS AND THE OFFICE OF SURVEILLANCE AND EPIDEMI-
OLOGY IN THE CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH 2 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrug 
SafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/UCM111520.pdf. The Office of 
Surveillance and Epidemiology in turn houses the Office of Pharmacovigilance 
I and II and the Office of Epidemiology I and II. Office of Surveillance and Ep-
idemiology (OSE)—Divisions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ 
ucm169536.htm (last updated Aug. 21, 2013). For CDER’s organizational 
structure see CDER Offices and Divisions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http:// 
www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/ 
CDER/ucm075128.htm (last updated Nov. 22, 2013).  
 140. See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1) (2012). 
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drug outweigh the risks of the drug,” and generally involve the 
submission of assessments to the FDA at eighteen months, 
three years, and seven years.141 In addition to these reports, 
REMS may also involve three other types of elements: (1) a 
Medication Guide, which is a document given to consumers 
that contains warning information for drugs that pose poten-
tially serious risks;142 (2) a communication plan, that may in-
clude “Dear Doctor” letters or the dissemination of information 
via professional societies;143 and (3) “elements to assure safe 
use” (ETASU), a catch-all category that might include, for ex-
ample, such safeguards as limiting access to a drug to those pa-
tients who enroll in a registry.144 The registry may include data 
on clinical outcomes and safety, among other things.145 Alt-
hough specific REMS goals are proposed by the drug sponsor 
and will be different in each case, an example goal suggested in 
the FDA’s draft guidance is “[p]atients taking W drug should be 
aware of the serious risks relative to the potential benefits.”146
REMS falls far short of the model of patient crowdsourcing 
proposed herein because, among other things, it leaves primary 
responsibility for data collection in the hands of drug spon-
sors.
  
147 In addition, its complicated processes and lack of stand-
ardization148 have led to criticisms that it is burdensome to both 
patients and healthcare system as a whole.149 In one case, for 
example, the imposition of REMS resulted in a 39% drop in 
consumption.150
 
 141. Id. § 355-1(a)(1), (d). 
 Because sales rebounded to expected levels af-
 142. Id. § 355-1(e)(2). 
 143. Id. § 355-1(e)(3). 
 144. Id. § 355-1(f)(1), (3)(F). 
 145. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FORMAT AND CON-
TENT OF PROPOSED RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES (REMS) 
14 (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/ 
UCM184128.pdf. 
 146. Id. at 9. 
 147. See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1) (stating that the drug sponsor is responsi-
ble for submitting proposed REMS). 
 148. See Scot Walker, Maximizing REMS Potential, DRUG TOPICS, Sept. 
2012, at 24, 24.  
 149. See Susan C. Nicholson et al., Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strate-
gies (REMS): Educating the Prescriber, 35 DRUG SAFETY 91, 102 (2012) 
(“REMS for the opioid class of drugs with potentially burdensome require-
ments for the healthcare system has been under discussion . . . since March 
2009.”). 
 150. Kate Traynor, REMS Review Explores Programs’ Burdens, 69 AM. J. 
HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 92, 94 (2012). 
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ter 10 months,151 this drop likely reflected the system’s burdens 
rather than thoughtful and deliberate patient avoidance result-
ing from a newfound appreciation of product risks. These bur-
dens of REMS almost certainly will translate into increased 
costs for the industry, with likely impact on the drug costs 
faced by consumers.152 Moreover, at one point almost half of all 
REMS plans included only a medication guide.153 Simply hand-
ing another lengthy document to patients, without more, is un-
likely to have as great a degree of impact as would involving 
patients directly in data collection.154
Despite its challenges, REMS establishes the feasibility of 
a number of elements that may be desirable in a crowdsourcing 
model. The example goal of increased patient awareness of the 
risks of “W drug”
 
155 is a nod in the direction of informed con-
sent, although it is stated merely as an aspiration rather than 
a requirement for treatment. REMS also confirms the feasibil-
ity of conditioning the distribution of new drugs on the agree-
ment to collect and report information related to clinical out-
comes.156 Although REMS places this burden on the drug 
sponsor, the statutory language appears flexible enough to 
place the obligation to report, at least indirectly, on the pa-
tients themselves. REMS allows drug sponsors to monitor and 
evaluate implementation “by health care providers, pharma-
cists, and other parties in the healthcare system who are re-
sponsible for implementing [elements to assure safe use];”157
 
 151. Id. 
 the 
inclusion of the phrase “and other parties” suggests that the 
statute may allow at least part of the obligation to report to be 
placed on patients themselves. Finally, REMS provides for the 
possibility that the reporting of assessments beyond year three 
be eliminated if the FDA determines that serious risks have 
 152. See Nicholson et al., supra note 149, at 102.  
 153. See Dima Qato & G. Caleb Alexander, Improving the Food and Drug 
Administration’s Mandate to Ensure Postmarketing Drug Safety, 306 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 1595, 1595 (2011).  
 154. See id. (“The ability of Medication Guides alone to substantially im-
prove the safe use of drugs remains doubtful and unproven, at best.”).  
 155. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 145, at 9. 
 156. See Andrew Wilson & Christopher-Paul Milne, FDA’s Risk Evaluation 
and Mitigation Strategies (REMS): Effective and Efficient Safety Tools or Pro-
cess Poltergeist?, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 569, 574 (2011) (“[P]harmacists have 
often had to maintain multiple sets of records that exist separately from their 
normal systems, creating considerable redundancy and complexity.”).  
 157. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(4) (2012) (emphasis added).  
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been adequately identified and managed.158
2. Conditional Approval, Accelerated Approval, and Phase 4 
Studies 
 This provision sug-
gests that, in the proposed crowdsourcing model, a three-year 
period following a conditional approval may be a reasonable de-
fault period after which the approval could become a regular 
approval unless contrary action is taken by the FDA.  
A number of other FDA-administered programs allow for 
relatively faster approval in conjunction with some form of 
post-approval data gathering. Under the FDA’s accelerated ap-
proval regulations, the FDA may grant approval based on a so-
called “surrogate endpoint,” such as tumor shrinkage, that is 
believed to correlate with a clinical endpoint, such as increased 
survival for cancer patients.159 As a condition to the grant of ac-
celerated approval, the drug sponsor is required to complete 
Phase 4 studies to verify clinical benefit.160 FDA oversight of 
Phase 4 studies has been lax, however, according to the U.S. 
Office of the Inspector General.161 In addition, Phase 4 testing 
generally involves only a tiny fraction of the post-approval 
market, if such testing is conducted at all.162
The FDA also administers a conditional approval program 
for animal drugs under which a drug may be marketed before 
complete efficacy data is available so long as two conditions are 
met. First, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the drug 
is effective.
 In contrast, 
crowdsourcing would seek to capture a much larger percentage, 
perhaps approaching 100%, of this market. Like accelerated 
approval, crowdsourcing might allow for somewhat earlier 
(conditional) approval of a drug, balanced by better disclosure 
to patients and improved post-approval data capture. 
163
 
 158. Id. § 355(d)(4)(C). 
 Second, the drug must have been proven safe in 
 159. 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (2013) (referring to drugs); id. § 601.41 (referring 
to biologics); see also id. § 312.85 (describing “Phase 4 Studies”). 
 160. Id. § 314.510; id. § 601.41.  
 161. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-01-04-00390, FDA’S MONITORING OF 
POSTMARKETING STUDY COMMITMENTS, at iii, 17 (2006); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-402, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED 
IN FDA’S POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS, at 5 
(2006) (“FDA lacks a clear and effective process for making decisions about, 
and providing management oversight of, postmarket drug safety issues.”). 
 162. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 161, at 17. 
 163. 21 U.S.C. § 360ccc(a)(2)(B). 
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accordance with the usual full FDA approval standard.164 The 
label of any new animal drug that has been only conditionally 
approved must bear a statement that the drug has been “condi-
tionally approved by FDA pending a full demonstration of effec-
tiveness under application number [_________].”165 A 
crowdsourcing model might borrow this notice requirement 
from the conditional approval statute. Drugs that have been on-
ly conditionally approved could bear a statement analogous to 
the one just quoted, either instead of or in addition to a clear 
marking, such as a pink cap or symbol as suggested above.166
The conditional approval statute also provides for the pos-
sibility that the one-year conditional approval may be extended 
for up to four additional years, for a total of five years.
  
167
In addition to REMS and the accelerated and conditional 
approval programs, the FDA also administers a post-market 
surveillance program called MedWatch, which approaches a 
true crowdsourcing model in that it accepts input from a dis-
tributed group of patients, doctors, and others relating to the 
adverse effects of approved drugs.  
 
Crowdsourcing following a conditional approval would simply 
serve to clarify efficacy levels while also gathering adverse 
event data in a more ethical and comprehensive manner. Like 
the animal drug statute, the conditional approval system im-
plemented in connection with a post-approval crowdsourcing 
system could involve the ability to extend the conditional ap-
proval period following a default term of three years (or some 
other duration deemed appropriate by the FDA based on statis-
tical considerations). After three years, the conditional approv-
al would automatically become a regular approval unless the 
FDA acts to prevent this.  
3. FDA MedWatch Program  
MedWatch crowdsources post-approval safety information 
of drugs, biologics, medical devices, dietary supplements, infant 
formula, and cosmetics.168
 
 164. See id. § 360ccc(a)(2)(A); see also Laura Avery, Conditional Approval 
for Animal Drugs: What Does This Mean for Veterinarians?, FDA VETERINAR-
IAN NEWSL. (FDA, Washington D.C.), Apr. 28, 2011, available at http://www 
.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/FDAVeterinarianNewsletter/ 
ucm252075.htm.  
 The program allows both consumers 
 165. 21 U.S.C. § 360ccc(f)(1)(A).  
 166. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 167. 21 U.S.C. § 360ccc(d).  
 168. How Consumers Can Report an Adverse Event or Serious Problem to 
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and healthcare professionals to submit “serious adverse events” 
or “therapeutic inequivalance/failure[s]” that are suspected of 
being associated with an FDA approved-product.169 According to 
MedWatch Medical Director Norman Marks, the program is 
needed because “[s]ometimes there are risks that only come to 
light after a medical product gets on the market and is used in 
a larger number of patients, for a longer period of time, and in 
patients whose health characteristics are different from those 
of the patients studied before approval.”170
While the program seeks to address post-approval safety 
concerns and utilizes the crowdsourcing of information as a 
means to do so, there are substantial differences between 
MedWatch and the current proposal. First, although consumers 
under the MedWatch program may file reports directly with 
the FDA, they are encouraged to take the FDA’s reporting form 
(FDA form 3500) to their doctors who “can provide clinical in-
formation based on [the consumer’s] medical record that can 
help FDA evaluate [the consumer’s] report.”
  
171 Because the re-
porting system is voluntary (sometimes referred to as “pas-
sive”172), it has been widely acknowledged that most relevant 
adverse events likely go unreported.173
 
FDA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch/ 
HowToReport/ucm053074.htm (last updated June 5, 2013) [hereinafter Re-
porting by Consumers]. 
 Similarly, because the 
 169. Reporting Serious Problems to FDA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch/HowToReport/default.htm (last updated 
Aug. 23, 2013). Manufacturers are also required to report adverse events of 
which they are aware. See id. The Federal Adverse Event Reporting System 
(FAERS) combines these mandatory reports with the voluntary reports sub-
mitted by patients and physicians via MedWatch. See FDA Adverse Event Re-
porting System (FAERS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/ 
AdverseDrugEffects/default.htm (last updated Sept. 10, 2012); see also Syed 
Rizwanuddin Ahmad, Adverse Drug Event Monitoring at the Food and Drug 
Administration, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 57, 57 (2003) (“AERS receives ad-
verse events information from 2 principal sources: mandatory reports from 
pharmaceutical companies . . . and adverse event reports that physicians, 
pharmacists, nurses, dentists, and consumers submit directly to the FDA’s 
MedWatch program.”). 
 170. FDA 101: How to Use the Consumer Complaint System and 
MedWatch, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ 
ConsumerUpdates/ucm049087.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2013). 
 171. Reporting by Consumers, supra note 168. 
 172. See Eichler et al., supra note 25, at 823. 
 173. See Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 760 F. Supp. 2d 220, 234 (D.N.H. 
2011) (“According to FDA estimates, more than 90 percent of adverse events 
go unreported.”). 
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system involves ad hoc, non-obligatory reporting174 on a stand-
ardized form that applies to everything from drugs to cosmet-
ics, large amounts of valuable efficacy or other data is often not 
collected.175 In 2010, patients and physicians directly submitted 
28,950 spontaneous reports,176 with many lacking critical in-
formation.177
In contrast, the proposed crowdsourcing system would pro-
actively make contact with patients around the time of pre-
scription by obtaining each patient’s consent and encouraging 
(or possibly, requiring
 Most importantly, however, the program does lit-
tle or nothing to warn consumers at the time of prescription 
that a given drug is new or that new drugs continue to carry 
risk, failing completely to address the ethical issue of lack of in-
formed consent. 
178
 
 174. Drug sponsors, in contrast to patients and healthcare providers, are 
required to report adverse events of which they are aware. 21 C.F.R. § 310.305 
(2013) (applying to marketed prescription drugs without new drug applica-
tions); id. § 312.32(c)(1)(i–iv) (referring to clinical trials); id. § 314.80 (referring 
to new drug applications); id. § 314.98 (applying to abbreviated new drug ap-
plications); id. § 600.80 (referring to biological products). 
) that patient to participate in the asso-
ciated crowdsourcing project. Rather than use a standardized 
form, Internet-based questions could be tailored to the particu-
lar drug and condition in question. For example, patients tak-
ing cholesterol-lowering drugs might be given the option to 
check off boxes corresponding to side effects such as muscle 
pain, stomach pain, diarrhea, or headache. If the patient an-
swers in the affirmative, the software might prompt for addi-
tional information, such as the number of hours that elapsed 
between drug administration and the adverse effect. Questions 
could be created based upon commonly experienced adverse 
events of existing drugs within the same class. Although the 
 175. See MedWatch Online Voluntary Reporting Form, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., https://www/accessdata/fda/gov/scripts/medwatch (last visited Nov. 
25, 2013). 
 176. Reports Received and Reports Entered into FAERS by Year, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory 
Information/Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/ucm070434.htm (last updated 
June 11, 2013).  
 177. Review of the FDA/CDER Pharmacovigilance Program, FDA SCI. BD. 
SUBCOMM. (May 20, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Advisory 
Committees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/ScienceBoardtotheFoodandDrug 
Administration/UCM255639.pdf; see Ahmad, supra note 169, at 57 (“One of 
the limitations of spontaneous reports is that, in general, they are poorly doc-
umented . . . .”).  
 178. Mandatory patient registries created under REMS, for example, 
demonstrate the feasibility of a participation requirement. See supra note 144 
and accompanying text.  
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questions would vary depending on the drug, there could be co-
ordination among different medications in the same class or in 
related classes in order to maximize comparability of the data. 
A free-form box might allow patients to enter other adverse 
events possibly related to the medicine that were not included 
in the prepared list. If a particular new or unusual side effect is 
reported in a sufficient number of responses, system adminis-
trators might add that side effect to the existing list. The sys-
tem would therefore be standardized, while retaining flexibil-
ity. Patients would of course remain free to consult with their 
doctors, and doctors would be free to continue to report adverse 
events, but primary responsibility for data submission would 
remain with the patient.179
A final program administered by the FDA, known as Sen-
tinel, aggregates vast quantities of dispersed patient data, but 
does so indirectly by examining existing health records con-
tained in the databases of entities such as insurance companies 
and hospitals.  
 Importantly, patients should be 
provided the ability to learn more about the drug they are tak-
ing or other treatments, as an incentive to visit and contribute 
to the site. This information could include aggregated and 
anonymized safety and efficacy data derived from the responses 
of others.  
4. Sentinel  
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 
2007 (FDAAA) recognized, in the words of one scholar, that 
“drawing more information from the physician-patient experi-
ence into the regulatory process with enhanced FDA market 
presence will shore up the reliability of prescription drugs.”180
 
 179. Placing primary responsibility on patients would reverse the practice 
of the current system, under which FDA encourages patients to report indi-
rectly via their physicians, rather than complete the online form themselves. 
See Reporting by Consumers, supra note 
 
To this end, Congress directed the FDA to collaborate with pub-
lic, academic, and private entities to “develop validated meth-
ods for the establishment of a post-market risk identification 
and analysis system to link and analyze safety data from mul-
168. Although patients can neverthe-
less self-report, the online form is currently not tailored to any particular 
drug. Id.  
 180. See Michael J. Malinowski, Doctors, Patients, and Pills—A System 
Popping Under Too Much Physician Discretion? A Law-Policy Prescription to 
Make Drug Approval More Meaningful in the Delivery of Healthcare, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1085, 1121 (2012).  
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tiple sources, with the goals of including, in aggregate . . . at 
least 100,000,000 patients by July 1, 2012.”181 Once these 
methods are established, the FDA is further directed by the 
FDAAA to establish procedures for post-market risk surveil-
lance that involves data mining of electronic health data (such 
as Medicare data or private health insurance claims data).182 
Embracing this statutory command, the FDA launched its Sen-
tinel Initiative in 2008183 and reported achieving the milestone 
of 100 million patients in June 2012.184
The Sentinel Initiative is a major milestone in post-market 
monitoring because it allows active surveillance of safety rather 
than relying on the passive reporting that characterizes other 
programs such as MedWatch.
  
185 It is also notable for its com-
mitment to leverage a distributed network of data and place re-
sults in the public domain.186
Nevertheless, the Sentinel Initiative has a number of 
drawbacks that might be addressed by the proposed 
crowdsourcing system. First, the Sentinel Initiative is primari-
ly aimed at risk identification and analysis, and does not direct-
ly address efficacy research.
  
187 Second, the Government Ac-
countability Office has reported that the FDA’s funds for 
purchasing data have been chronically inadequate, despite in-
creases.188
 
 181. 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(B) (2012). 
 Third, and most importantly, Sentinel is layered and 
 182. Id. § 355(k)(3)(C).  
 183. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE SENTINEL INITIATIVE: ACCESS TO ELEC-
TRONIC HEALTHCARE DATA FOR MORE THAN 25 MILLION LIVES 2 (2010), avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative/ 
UCM233360.pdf [hereinafter THE SENTINEL INITIATIVE]; FDA's Sentinel Initi-
ative: Transforming How We Monitor the Safety of FDA-Regulated Products, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative/ 
ucm2007250.htm (last updated Nov. 22, 2013). 
 184. Melissa Robb, FDA’s Mini-Sentinel Exceeds 100 Million Lives (and 
Counting), FDA VOICE (June 29, 2012), http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/ 
2012/06/fdas-mini-sentinel-exceeds-100-million-lives-and-counting-a-major 
-milestone-in-developing-a-nationwide-rapid-response-electronic-medical 
-product-safety-surveillance-program.  
 185. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 186. See About Mini-Sentinel: Background, MINI-SENTINEL, http://www. 
mini-sentinel.org/about_us (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).  
 187. See Bethany Fox, Closing the Information Gap: Informing Better Med-
ical Decisionmaking Through the Use of Post-Market Safety and Comparative 
Effectiveness Information, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 83, 91–92 (2012). But see Ev-
ans, supra note 10, at 497–98 (arguing that through a “sleight of definition” 
the FDAAA does allow efficacy research).  
 188. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 133, at 11, 28–30. 
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cumbersome.189 The FDA’s acknowledgement that the Sentinel 
is a “complex endeavor”190 puts it mildly. Five years after the 
FDAAA, the FDA is still conducting a pilot program called 
Mini-Sentinel whose scope and complexity belie its name.191 Ra-
ther than allowing individuals to contribute directly to a data-
base that could be mined for data, Mini-Sentinel begins with 
the formulation of questions by the FDA that are transmitted 
to a Coordinating Center, which in turn submits these ques-
tions to more than twenty collaborating institutions including 
insurance companies and hospitals.192 These collaborating insti-
tutions then mine their own databases, transmit the summa-
rized results to the Coordinating Center, which in turn aggre-
gates the responses and transmits them to the FDA.193 The 
process requires each collaborating partner to transform its da-
ta into standardized format.194 It has so far cost at least $125 
million.195
Crowdsourcing has a number of advantages over the Sen-
tinel system. The primary motivating factor behind this com-
plex, layered approach seems to be a concern for patient priva-
cy, although a desire to leverage existing data and involve 
established institutions are probably also factors. In the pro-
posed crowdsourcing system, by contrast, privacy concerns in 
most cases would be largely avoided by encouraging patients to 
contribute information of their own volition. For those situa-
tions where data collection is especially critical (such as with 
certain drugs currently subject to REMS), patient reporting 
could be required and privacy safeguarded in a manner analo-
 
 
 189. See JUDITH A. RACOOSIN ET AL., FDA’s Sentinel Initiative: Active Sur-
veillance to Identify Safety Signals, in PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY 544–47 (Bri-
an L. Strom et al. eds., 5th ed. 2012); Richard Platt et al., The U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration's Mini-Sentinel Program: Status and Direction, 21(S1) 
PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 1, 3–5 (2012) (describing the com-
plex structure of the Mini-Sentinel Distributed Data System). 
 190. THE SENTINEL INITIATIVE, supra note 183, at 2. 
 191. See About Mini-Sentinel: Background, supra note 186. 
 192. THE SENTINEL INITIATIVE, supra note 183, at 5. 
 193. Id. at 4–5; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, § 6301(b), 124 Stat. 119, 740 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-
37(f) (2006)) (mandating “the development and use of clinical registries and 
health outcomes research data networks, in order to develop and maintain a 
comprehensive, interoperable data network to collect, link, and analyze data 
on outcomes and effectiveness from multiple sources, including electronic 
health records”).  
 194. THE SENTINEL INITIATIVE, supra note 183, at 6. 
 195. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 
(FDAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 905(d), 121 Stat. 823 (2007).  
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gous to that provided under the current system. Data quality 
could also be improved. Unlike Sentinel, which relies on preex-
isting data created for other purposes that often lacks key in-
formation on relevant health factors,196 a crowdsourcing plat-
form could prompt users to enter the information that is 
relevant to the task. Voluntary contribution of data would also 
lead to cost savings, since there would be no need to purchase 
data, although costs for platform development, awareness cam-
paigns, and data analysis would still be necessary. There would 
also be no need to undertake the challenging task of integrating 
data distributed across disparate providers, such as where a 
patient receives a diagnosis at one health center, reports an 
adverse event at a second, and receives follow-up treatment at 
a third, possibly each in different states or countries. Whereas 
the Sentinel system requires transfer of information from pa-
tient to doctor to database to Coordinating Center to FDA,197
D. SYNTHESIS 
 
crowdsourcing would vastly simplify the process by accepting 
direct entry of data by patients into an online platform where 
anonymized data would be aggregated and analyzed directly by 
the FDA, interested third parties, or even patients themselves. 
The above discussion suggests that crowdsourcing clinical 
trials is not only feasible, but may be able to improve upon var-
ious aspects of current practice. The feasibility of crowdsourc-
ing is reflected in the fact that some form of crowdsourcing is 
already present in existing FDA policies and programs, includ-
ing REMS, accelerated approval, MedWatch, and Sentinel. 
Consumers are already able to report clinical outcomes directly 
to the FDA, even if in practice this happens only in a sporadic 
manner. Conditional or other forms of early approval followed 
by post-approval data gathering already find precedent in the 
law.  
The proposed system, however, would seek to improve up-
on the status quo in a number of ways. First, under the pro-
posed system, most if not all patients would be invited to offer 
feedback at the time of prescription about the medicines they 
 
 196. Asher Mullard, Unleashing the Mini-Sentinel, 11 NATURE REVIEWS 
DRUG DISCOVERY 255, 256 (2012) (pointing at the lack of potentially useful 
information related to patient weight or pulmonary function).  
 197. See Susan Forrow et al., The Organizational Structure and Governing 
Principles of the Food and Drug Administration’s Mini-Sentinel Pilot Program, 
21(S1) PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 12, 13 (2012). 
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are about to consume. Such proactive, routine, and early com-
munication with patients would help to ensure against the oc-
currence of human testing without consent, resolving the ethi-
cal flaw that exists today. Second, the model would seek to 
transform MedWatch’s drab and tedious online form into an ex-
citing, user-friendly portal of information, where patients could 
input not only adverse events, but also perceived benefits and 
even comparative impressions of the medicine vis-à-vis other 
drug or non-drug treatments. Third, although the altruistic de-
sire to contribute information in order to help others would re-
main a motivation, patients under the proposed model would be 
incentivized to contribute primarily by the self-interested de-
sire to visit a website where they can learn more about the 
drug they are taking. Dramatically expanding the functionality 
of the current system so that patients (or prospective patients) 
could easily review both the individual and aggregated feed-
back of others would therefore be a key element of the proposed 
model. In short, the crowdsourcing model would improve the 
status quo by turning a world of passive and disconnected pa-
tients into a community of people who are united by a common 
desire to learn about a medicine and share their experiences in 
using it.  
For some drugs, particularly those used to treat minor 
conditions, only a fraction of patients are likely to thoroughly 
embrace and participate in any voluntary crowdsourcing plat-
form. Yet even a small percentage could contribute a volume of 
data vastly greater than that produced under current pro-
grams, both because the entire population of patients would be 
potentially able to contribute and because participation would 
not be limited by proximity to a clinical trial site. Geographic 
inclusiveness, in particular, would be expanded immensely in 
light of the ubiquity of mobile phones around the world. The 
promise of “big data” for solving healthcare problems is only 
now beginning to be appreciated and explored.198
A fourth improvement over the status quo stems from the 
fact that the Internet is ideally suited for the automation of da-
ta aggregation and analysis. In contrast to current clinical trial 
practice, therefore, the proposed crowdsourcing model would 
 
 
 198. See, e.g., Meghan F. Coakley et al., Unlocking the Power of Big Data at 
the National Institutes of Health, 1 BIG DATA 183 (2013); Simon I. Hay et al., 
Big Data Opportunities for Global Infectious Disease Surveillance, PLOS MED-
ICINE, Apr. 2, 2013, http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi% 
2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001413.  
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avoid the need to translate patient input, via healthcare-
worker intermediaries, from an analog paper environment to a 
digital one. This would help to reduce the likelihood of data en-
try errors and speed discovery of adverse events.199
Fifth and finally, there is an advantage to crowdsourcing 
that both the government and public should find particularly 
attractive: cost. REMS places substantial and possibly onerous 
burdens on drug companies.
  
200 Government monitoring, partic-
ularly Sentinel, requires a complex, layered infrastructure. 
These burdens are relatively new, having been implemented by 
FDAAA only in 2007.201
III.  ADDRESSING CHALLENGES   
 As their costs become clearer, pressure 
to substitute more efficient, less expensive means of collecting 
and disseminating relevant information will increase. A pa-
tient-driven, Internet-based crowdsourcing platform can shift 
part of the burden from the FDA, industry, and physicians, for 
whom data collection is an obligatory task, to patients who 
have a self-interested desire to both learn and share infor-
mation.  
Despite the potential advantages, there are numerous chal-
lenges and concerns that will have to be addressed as part of a 
clinical trial crowdsourcing system. These include concerns 
over data quality, a lack of ability or willingness of laypersons 
to participate, the absence of randomization, blinding and con-
trol, opposition from industry, the need to assure adequate pri-
vacy, and a range of potential legal hurdles. These challenges 
will be addressed in turn.  
 
 199. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 133 (ac-
knowledging that “automatic processing will cut down on errors related to da-
ta entry and should allow for more timely availability of reports”); cf. infra 
Part III.A.1 (addressing the concern that laypersons cannot contribute reliable 
data). 
 200. See, e.g., Anthera Pharm., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 29 
(Mar. 31, 2012), available at http://markets.on.nytimes.com/research/stocks/ 
fundamentals/drawFiling.asp?docKey=137-000110465912033177-0IOCR2NFG 
RD5ROBH157C2CDJON&docFormat=HTM&formType=10-Q (warning inves-
tors that REMS “may make it more difficult or burdensome . . . to obtain ap-
proval” and that “any approvals . . . may be . . . subject to onerous post-
approval requirements”). 
 201. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), 
Pub. L. No. 110-85, §§ 901 (REMS), 905a (Sentinel), 121 Stat. 823 (2007).  
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A. DATA QUALITY AND METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS 
The most significant concerns about crowdsourcing clinical 
trials relate to potential data quality problems, of which there 
are many. Laypersons may be insufficiently educated, insuffi-
ciently motivated, or simply lack the capacity to contribute to a 
clinical trial database. Even if sufficient participation and abil-
ity is assumed, crowdsourcing would not necessarily be ran-
domized, controlled, or blinded, and would therefore lack ap-
propriate scientific control.  
1. Laypersons Cannot Contribute Reliable Data 
Laypersons may be perceived as lacking the appropriate 
education, experience, or motivation to reliably obtain or enter 
clinical data.202
Although these are genuine challenges, they are not in-
surmountable. In some cases specialized equipment may not be 
needed, such as when evaluating the efficacy of analgesic medi-
cines (painkillers) or decongestants. In other cases, simple 
equipment that most consumers can use either with or without 
physician instruction will be adequate, such as the use of a 
 Most laypersons will not have medical training 
or experience in administering clinical trials. In some cases, 
equipment will be needed to obtain trial data that patients 
simply will not have. Few patients, for example, have sphyg-
momanometers at home with which to measure blood pressure, 
and even if the device were provided its use would require some 
training and would in any event pose practical problems for 
self-administration (the use of a traditional sphygmomanome-
ter is easier with two hands). In other cases, the evaluation 
may ultimately address characteristics that require complex 
judgments, such as the extent to which a patient is depressed 
or has reduced cognitive ability (e.g., Alzheimer’s). It might also 
be feared that the absence of tight controls or oversight with 
respect to data entry could allow drug sponsors, competitors, or 
other malicious actors to input fraudulent data that make 
drugs appear either better or worse than they really are.  
 
 202. The assumption that lay consumers lack the ability to appropriately 
interact with or address health-related issues without sufficient supervision is 
not limited to clinical trials. Prescription drugs and corrective eyewear, for ex-
ample, cannot lawfully be obtained without the permission of an authorized 
prescriber. The assumption of consumer ignorance and lack of self-control, 
etc., may be the proper subject of reexamination in light of the wealth of in-
formation that is now available to consumers via the Internet, but is beyond 
the scope of this Article.  
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home thermometer in the evaluation of the efficacy of an anti-
pyretic (fever-reducer). More complex questions of efficacy can 
be broken down into a series of simpler questions (e.g., level of 
depression or attention deficit). If the patient is unable to con-
tribute data (advanced Alzheimer’s Disease or pediatric condi-
tions, for example), parent, adult child, or other caregiver may 
be able to do so. Parents in particular may be especially atten-
tive, motivated, and comprehensive in reporting adverse events 
and improvements in their child’s condition and may have the 
ability to monitor and report on a more frequent basis than 
could a physician. In some cases where it is impractical to self-
evaluate with precision, such as measuring the effectiveness of 
sleeping pills in terms of minutes-until-sleep, patients can nev-
ertheless record their subjective post-hoc impressions, such as 
whether they think it took them more or less time to fall asleep 
after taking the medication, how restfully they slept, and 
whether they awoke during the night. Side-effects, as opposed 
to efficacy, will often be even easier to recognize and report. For 
example, the side effects reported in the labeling for Ditropan 
(oxybutynin, an incontinence drug), include headache, blurred 
vision, constipation, nausea, and dizziness.203
In many cases it may be straightforward for patients or 
their caregivers to self-report with respect to both efficacy and 
adverse events. Sometimes, however, self-reporting may simply 
not be possible, such as where measurements require lab work 
or cannot be performed outside of a healthcare facility. In these 
cases, patients could be given online access to their health rec-
ords.
  
204 It is common sense that patients should have easy ac-
cess to their own health records (with reasonable exceptions, as 
under current law205
 
 203. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REFERENCE ID 3105471, DITROPAN, at 9 tbl.3 
(2012), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2012/ 
017577s038lbl.pdf. 
), and with the move toward electronic 
health records the feasibility of accessing such data online in-
 204. Patients already have a general right of access, with some sensible 
exceptions, to their health records. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2012. However, the 
healthcare entity remains in control. Individuals must request access, and 
may have to wait up to sixty days for a response. Id. § 164.524(b)(2)(ii). That 
response may be a denial, in which case the patient has a right to appeal to an 
administrator within the healthcare entity, id. § 164.524(a)(3), but the right of 
review does not apply in all cases. Id. § 164.524(a)(2). “Access” may be satis-
fied by allowing inspection rather than copying. Id. § 164.524(c)(1). Finally, 
the healthcare provider may charge a fee. Id. § 164.524(c)(4). In short, access 
under the current regime is in most cases possible, but difficult. 
 205. Id. § 164.524. 
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creases. Electronic health records could even be leveraged to 
automatically transfer certain relevant data, reducing both the 
effort needed and the likelihood of errors.  
More generally, the assumption that data collected in the 
presence of a healthcare worker will be of higher quality than if 
input directly by patients may simply be wrong. From the per-
spective of physician-investigators, the administration of clini-
cal trials is a for-profit enterprise,206 and there may therefore be 
varying levels of commitment to ensuring data accuracy. Turn-
over among trial “monitors” is high,207 creating learning-curve 
quality concerns. Pharmaceutical companies, who have an in-
terest in sufficient numbers of trial participants completing the 
study protocol, may be eager to “grant ‘exceptions’ when pa-
tient-subjects have failed to follow the study protocol perfectly 
or mistakes are made.”208 There is evidence to indicate that a 
substantial minority (37%) of investigators fail to adequately 
supervise their trials, which has earned this derelict elite the 
appellation “phantom investigators.”209 In some cases, fortu-
nately a small minority, clinical trial staff have even committed 
outright misconduct such as the fabrication or falsification of 
data.210 In the case of post-approval adverse event reporting,211 
doctors may be “reluctant to take the time to fill out lengthy 
drug safety reports.”212
Some have estimated that under 1 percent of [post-approval] adverse 
events are reported by doctors. Indeed, the FDA has so little confi-
dence in safety information coming from physicians’ offices that they 
have a full-time staff whose job it is to read medical journals for let-
ters about drug reactions, figuring that doctors are actually more like-
ly to write to a journal than to the FDA.
 According to one commentator: 
213
 
 206. See FISHER, supra note 
 
51, at 39 (noting the increase of private clinical 
trials and compensation for physicians).  
 207. Id. at 117.  
 208. Id. at 123.  
 209. Valerie Gamache, Chasing Away Phantom Investigators, 8 CENTER-
WATCH 1, 1 (2001).  
 210. Barbara K. Redman et al., Research Misconduct Among Clinical Trial 
Staff, 12 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 481, 482 (2006) (noting 235 cases of alleged mis-
conduct during an eight-year period).  
 211. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 212. DAVID GRATZER, THE CURE: HOW CAPITALISM CAN SAVE AMERICAN 
HEALTHCARE 158 (2006). 
 213. Id. The 1% figure is derived from a 1984 study of data from a one-year 
period in 1970. See H. Denman Scott et al., Rhode Island Physicians’ Recogni-
tion and Reporting of Adverse Drug Reactions, 70 R.I. MED. J. 311, 316 (1987) 
(citing Allen C. Rossi & Deanne E. Knapp, Discovery of New Adverse Drug Re-
actions: A Review of the Food and Drug Administration’s Spontaneous Report-
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When adverse event reports are filled out, they are often 
woefully incomplete. One recent study, for example, found that 
more than a third of adverse event reports failed to record the 
age of the patient and that nearly half reported “other” as the 
outcome.214
Subjects who participate in clinical trials may also be more 
likely to contribute poorer data than might initially be pre-
sumed. Like physician-investigators, some clinical trial partici-
pants are motivated by the generous sums of money that are 
doled out to induce participation, potentially creating quality 
concerns.
  
215 In some cases, notably in Phase 1 trials, partici-
pants generally are not even suffering from the disease in ques-
tion. People are also subject to the social desire to express ap-
preciation for the efforts of their caregivers, and may politely 
inflate reports of improvement. At the same time, compliance 
in taking pills, recording journal entries, and showing up for 
appointments is reported to be a chronic problem216 and can 
make data analysis challenging.217 In addition, because subjects 
have the right to drop out of trials at any time for any reason,218
 
ing System, 252 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1030 (1984)). Another study reported the 
much higher figure of 5%, but this is still a very small minority. Audrey Smith 
Rogers et al., Physician Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behavior Related to Report-
ing Adverse Drug Events, 148 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1598, 1598, 1600 
(1988). This study also reported that “nearly half of physician respondents 
stated they were unaware that the FDA maintained a reporting system [at 
all].” Id. at 1599. Although awareness and reporting may have increased, the 
consensus view over the decades has been that only a small minority of ad-
verse events are reported. See Adil E. Shamoo, Adverse Event Reporting—The 
Tip of an Iceberg, 8 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RES. 197, 197 (2001).  
 
 214. Sheila Weiss-Smith et al., The FDA Drug Safety Surveillance Pro-
gram: Adverse Event Reporting Trends, 171 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 591, 
591 (2011). 
 215. Cf. Richard Titmuss, The Gift of Blood, 35 SOC’Y 88, 93 (1998) (“Over 
the past decade many studies . . . have incriminated the paid [blood] donor . . . 
as the major source of infection.”). 
 216. See, e.g., Graham Dunn & Els Goetghebeur, Analysing Compliance in 
Clinical Trials, 14 STAT. METHODS IN MED. RES. 325, 325 (2005) (“Clinical tri-
als and noncompliance form two sides of one coin . . . .”). 
 217. See Susan Armijo-Olivo et al., Intent to Treat Analysis, Compliance, 
Drop-Outs and How to Deal with Missing Data in Clinical Research: A Review, 
14 PHYSICAL THERAPY REVIEWS 36, 45 (2009) (“[I]t has been shown through 
recent simulation studies that [the ‘per protocol’] and [‘as treated’ approaches] 
provide inappropriate results when dealing with missing data.”); Jane C. 
Lindsey & Nuala M. McGrath, Interpreting Treatment Differences When Pa-
tients Drop Out of a Clinical Trial, 12 AIDS PATIENT CARE & STDS 275, 276 
(1998) (noting that the correlation between compliance and treatment effect 
“can make interpretation of treatment differences problematic”). 
 218. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (2012) (“[T]he subject may discontinue 
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data may be incomplete, which can similarly frustrate analy-
sis.219
In contrast, patients participating in crowdsourcing will 
have a different and perhaps better-aligned mix of motivations. 
Most importantly, they will have a personal interest in the out-
come of the “study” since, by virtue of their participation, they 
will normally be suffering from the disease in question. The 
sense of personal investment, described by one commentator as 
“hav[ing] a dog in the race,” has repeatedly been cited in expla-
nation of the success of various crowdsourcing models.
  
220 Pa-
tient contributions are also likely to be vastly greater in vol-
ume, since anyone with an Internet-enabled cell phone 
anywhere in the world could potentially contribute. According 
to Pedro Domingos, a professor of computer science and engi-
neering at the University of Washington who specializes in da-
ta mining, “a dumb algorithm with lots and lots of data beats a 
clever one with modest amounts of it,” at least “as a rule of 
thumb.”221
In the end, data quality problems will arise in any enter-
prise that involves data.
 
222
2. Laypersons May Be Unwilling or Unable to Participate 
 There is no question that a proposed 
crowdsourcing system that includes greater patient involve-
ment must be prepared to address the data quality issues that 
will inevitably arise. 
Some patients will be unwilling to contribute to the 
crowdsourcing of information for conditionally approved drugs. 
 
participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits . . . .”). 
 219. See A. Heyting et al., Statistical Handling of Drop-Outs in Longitudi-
nal Clinical Trials, 11 STAT. MED. 2043, 2043 (1992) (“In longitudinal clinical 
trials, difficulties often arise due to patients dropping out of the trial . . . .”). In 
particular, the reasons for drop-out can complicate analysis, and include both 
recovery and lack of improvement, among others. Id. at 2044.  
 220. Fox, supra note 113.  
 221. Pedro Domingos, A Few Useful Things to Know About Machine Learn-
ing, 55 COMM. ACM 78, 85 (2012); see also Alon Halevy et al., The Unreasona-
ble Effectiveness of Data, IEEE INTELLIGENT SYS., Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 8, 9 
(“For many tasks, once we have a billion or so examples, we essentially have a 
closed set that represents (or at least approximates) what we need, without 
generative rules.”). 
 222. See, e.g., David Wagner, Google Flu Trends Wildly Overestimated This 
Year’s Flu Outbreak, ATL. WIRE (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www 
.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/02/google-flu-trends-wildly 
-overestimated-years-flu-outbreak/62113 (noting Google Flu Trends suggested 
a 10% nationwide infection rate, while the more accurate number from the 
Centers for Disease Control was 6%).  
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To the extent that patients are unwilling to participate because 
they do not want to undertake the risks associated with new 
drugs, such unwillingness would itself vindicate the need for 
informed consent.  
In other cases, however, there may be a lack of willingness 
or ability to participate that is not related to risk. Some pa-
tients may be less able to participate due to illiteracy, the ab-
sence of an Internet-enabled cell phone or computer, or simply 
the lack of time or interest to become involved. In these cases, 
it becomes important to distinguish between the ethical func-
tion and the information-gathering function of the proposed 
crowdsourcing model. All patients who desire to consume a 
newly approved drug must, for ethical reasons, consent to the 
risks. Labeling a drug as “conditionally approved” and encour-
aging the patient to contribute adverse event and other out-
come data via an online crowdsourcing platform is almost cer-
tain to command the attention of the patient. Combined with 
an online consent form, the ethical function can therefore be 
fulfilled relatively quickly and easily.223
Nevertheless, there is reason for optimism. As noted above, 
patients have a vested interest in the safety and effectiveness 
of the drugs they take. An appropriately-designed crowdsourc-
ing platform would allow patients to view aggregate (and ap-
propriately anonymized) data contributed by others, satisfying 
the inherent desire for treatment-related information that suf-
fering individuals naturally exhibit. At the same time, the plat-
form would allow individuals to contribute their own data. 
While juxtaposing the presentation of data with the contribu-
tion of data might seem complicated from the perspective of ex-
isting clinical trial practice, this is what already occurs on es-
tablished crowdsourcing platforms such as the rating systems 
of eBay or Amazon.com, where users can both view data en-
tered by others and contribute their own ratings. Those rating 
 In contrast, the data 
gathering function would require a greater level of involvement 
that could, depending on the drug, last for months or even 
years. Embedding the consent form within the crowdsourcing 
platform could facilitate participation, but it is to be expected 
that only a portion of consumers during the conditional approv-
al period will fully contribute.  
 
 223. For illiterate individuals or those who lack access to the Internet, such 
online consent might be facilitated at a doctor’s office or pharmacy computer 
where risks could be explained orally and a digital signature, in the form of an 
“X” if necessary, could be entered.  
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systems may not be perfect, but the success of those companies 
and others attest to the fact that even an imperfect system can 
be immeasurably useful.224
In addition, patients may be motivated to contribute to 
post-approval crowdsourcing by pride in authorship and the 
satisfaction of contributing to a public good, rather than by 
money. Such motivations seem to underlie the vast contribu-
tions to other crowdsourced public goods, such as Wikipedia.
  
225 
It may also be possible to create opportunities for what has 
been termed “microattribution,”226 where crowdsourcing partic-
ipants are given credit—using a pseudonym or “handle,” if they 
like—for the data that they enter. Free-form comments entered 
by contributors about efficacy or safety might be labeled this 
way, for example. The not-for-profit nature of the crowdsourc-
ing sponsor can also be important, since contributors may be 
more hesitant to contribute to a “public good” without compen-
sation if the product of those efforts will be leveraged to fill a 
corporation’s coffers.227 For this reason, the post-approval phase 
of drug evaluation should probably be administered either by a 
government affiliated non-profit or the government itself. 
MedWatch and other post-approval surveillance programs are 
already administered this way.228
It may also be possible to incentivize participation more di-
rectly. For example, insurance reimbursement could be aug-
mented, or insurance premiums reduced, for those patients who 
enter complete data. The possibility of using insurance premi-
um incentives to encourage insureds to take certain actions has 
long been reflected in automobile insurance industry practice, 
where premium discounts are made available for insureds who 
  
 
 224. See James R. Wolf & Waleed A. Muhanna, Feedback Mechanisms, 
Judgment Bias, and Trust Formation in Online Auctions, 42 DECISION SCI. 43, 
47 (2011) (summarizing research related to electronic feedback systems and 
concluding that “online reputation systems can be effective in reducing per-
ceived transaction-specific risk due to information asymmetry”).  
 225. See generally Andrea Forte & Amy Bruckman, Why Do People Write 
for Wikipedia? Incentives to Contribute to Open-Content Publishing, PROC. 
GROUP, at 4 (2005), http://jellis.org/work/group2005/papers/forteBruckman 
IncentivesGroup.pdf (“[C]ontributors often claim ownership of articles on their 
own user pages by creating lists of the articles for which they believe they 
ought to receive credit.”).  
 226. See Crowdsourcing Human Mutations, 43 NATURE GENETICS 279, 279 
(2011).  
 227. Following the Crowd, supra note 111. 
 228. See supra Part II.C. 
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complete approved driver safety courses, for example.229 The 
motivation for insurance companies to offer incentives is that 
the desired consumer action will, on average and in the long 
term, reduce the dollar value of claims that must be paid out. 
Coverage could even be made conditional on the contribution of 
data, a model that is already utilized by Medicare’s “coverage 
with evidence development” (CED) program under which an 
“item or service is covered only when provided within a setting 
in which there is a pre-specified process for gathering addition-
al data.”230
3. Crowdsourcing Is Neither Randomized, Controlled, Nor 
Blinded 
 Existing programs such as these suggest the practi-
cality of directly incentivizing individuals to participate in 
crowdsourcing. 
An obvious concern to the crowdsourcing of what essential-
ly amounts to clinical trial data is that it may not produce use-
ful information. Unlike clinical trials, crowdsourced infor-
mation would be neither randomized, controlled, nor double-
blinded. This is a significant reason for pause. However, con-
cerns over the absence of these “gold standard” characteristics 
in post-approval data collection are substantially mitigated by 
the fact that, by the time crowdsourcing begins, the drug will 
have already undergone clinical trial Phases 1, 2, and 3. Under 
the current system, these trials generally (but not always) are 
randomized, controlled, and double-blinded. The primary pur-
pose of crowdsourced information is therefore to supplement 
gold-standard testing, not replace it. In addition, the volume of 
crowdsourced data may be orders of magnitude larger than 
clinical trial data, potentially allowing detection of efficacy or 
risk characteristics that had gone undetected during clinical 
trials, such as effects on subpopulations or rare adverse events. 
The FDA would not rely solely on this information to approve 
additional indications, but it could influence the decision of 
 
 229. See, e.g., Auto Discounts Available in New York, STATE FARM, http:// 
www.statefarm.com/insurance/auto_insurance/discounts/new-york.asp (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2013) (describing both a driver training discount and an acci-
dent prevention course discount). 
 230. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR THE PUBLIC, 
INDUSTRY, AND CMS STAFF: NATIONAL COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS WITH DA-
TA COLLECTION AS A CONDITION OF COVERAGE: COVERAGE WITH EVIDENCE 
DEVELOPMENT, at III(5) (2006), available at https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/ 
Coverage/determinationprocess/downloads/ced.pdf. The authority for the CED 
policy is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(E) (2006).  
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drug sponsors to undertake particular Phase 4 trials, or of the 
FDA to require certain trials, and it could also affect subse-
quent trial design.  
4. Health Information Is Too Technical and Complex to Be 
Crowdsourced 
Although health challenges might appear to be too tech-
nical or complex to be effectively crowdsourced, a number of ex-
isting and historic examples suggest that this is not the case.231
[W]hen a man is ill they lay him in the public square, and the pass-
ers-by come up to him, and if they have ever had this disease them-
selves, or have known any one who has suffered from it, they give him 
advice, recommending him to do whatever they found good in their 
own case . . . .
 
Among these is the remarkable practice of health information 
crowdsourcing described by Herodotus who, as an historian 
writing in the fifth century B.C., has provided what must be 
one of the earliest recorded instances of crowdsourcing of any 
type:  
232
In the modern era, a project co-led by the World Bank and 
the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations utilized 
prize-based crowdsourcing to incentivize the development of a 
pneumococcal vaccine that was successfully rolled out in 
2011.
 
233
While the crowdsourcing of treatment options and the de-
velopment of a new pneumonia vaccine serotype provide evi-
dence that crowdsourcing may have some place in the broader 
healthcare sphere, these examples do not speak directly to the 
feasibility of using crowdsourcing to evaluate the safety and ef-
ficacy of a given new treatment, i.e., to the crowdsourcing of 
clinical trials. However, a number of new organizations or plat-
forms have begun to move into this space, providing early in-
 Google-backed startup 23andMe.com is gathering mas-
sive amounts of genetic data directly from the public and invit-
ing customers to contribute information that can clarify the 
role of genetics in disease.  
 
 231. See generally USING WEB 2.0 FOR HEALTH INFORMATION (Paula 
Younger & Peter Morgan eds., 2011) (compiling more than a dozen short arti-
cles exploring the use of blogs, wikis, RSS fees, and other Web 2.0 technologies 
to, for example, support research (Chapter 5), identify health content for the 
developing world (Chapter 6), and support patient needs (Chapter 7)).  
 232. See VII TRANSACTIONS OF THE NEW YORK STATE MEDICAL ASSOCIA-
TION 355 (E.D. Ferguson ed., 1890) (quoting Herodotus). 
 233. See Jonathan J. Darrow, Essential Medicines: Why International Price 
Discrimination May Increasingly Be the Wrong Solution to a Global Drug 
Problem, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 291, 294 (2011).  
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sight into how clinical trial crowdsourcing might work. 
DIYgenomics, founded in 2010, bills itself as a “non-profit re-
search organization founded . . . to realize personalized medi-
cine through crowdsourced health studies and apps.”234 
CureTogether, an organization founded in 2008 that discarded 
the earlier name “Patient-Driven Research” as too long, is cur-
rently partnering with universities to conduct health-related 
studies using online methods for gathering data.235 One of the-
se, co-sponsored with Emory University, is seeking to deter-
mine whether online crowdsourcing of dermatological survey 
information can outperform clinic-based collection of such da-
ta.236 A means to conduct crowdsourced clinical trials online has 
been provided by another company called Genomera, whose 
web-based platform allows third-party researchers to conduct 
clinical studies “at Internet scale.”237 Researchers can create a 
study, enroll participants, automate protocol tasks and data 
collection, communicate with participants, and analyze re-
sults.238
With all of the new health information generated by the 
crowd, venues are needed to aggregate, organize, and distribute 
it. Treato seeks to synthesize the billions of online health-
related discussions into usable information, including efficacy 
comparisons of similar medications.
  
239 The Journal of Participa-
tory Medicine has emerged as a forum for the publication of re-
search related to crowdsourced health research, among other 
topics.240
 
 234. About DIYgenomics, DIYGENOMICS, http://www.diygenomics.org/about 
.php (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
  
 235. About CureTogether, CURETOGETHER, http://curetogether.com/blog/ 
about (last visited Nov. 25, 2013); Ongoing Studies, CURETOGETHER, http:// 
curetogether.com/blog/ongoing-studies (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
 236. Welcome to the Emory University School of Medicine Dermatology 
Study at CureTogether, CURETOGETHER, http://curetogether.com/ 
emoryudermstudy (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).  
 237. We’re Crowd-Sourcing Health Discovery by Helping Anyone Create 
Group Health Studies, GENOMERA, http://genomera.com (last visited Nov. 25, 
2013).  
 238. Clinical Studies at Internet Scale, GENOMERA, https://docs.google.com/ 
spreadsheet/viewform?formkey=dEJNbm5ucERfVW91NjV5eDQ4cVJ6eWc6M 
Q#gid=0 (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
 239. See What Millions of Patients Are Saying, TREATO, http://treato.com 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
 240. J. PARTICIPATORY MED., http://www.jopm.org (last visited Nov. 25, 
2013); see, e.g., Melanie Swan et al., Citizen Science Genomics as a Model for 
Crowdsourced Preventive Medicine Research, J. PARTICIPATORY MED., Dec. 23, 
2010, http://www.jopm.org/evidence/research/2010/12/23/citizen-science 
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B. LEGAL, ETHICAL, AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES 
Despite the nascent forms of healthcare crowdsourcing just 
described, there remain a number of legal, ethical, and political 
challenges to the creation of generally applicable government-
backed crowdsourcing model herein proposed. These concerns 
relate to statutory clinical trial standards, privacy, uncertainty 
communication, and opposition from various stakeholders.  
1. Crowdsourcing Does Not Meet the Statutory Requirements 
of “Adequate and Well-Controlled” Studies 
The scientific concern that crowdsourcing is not random-
ized, controlled, or blinded has an analogous legal concern, 
namely, that crowdsourcing cannot meet the standards for “ad-
equate and well-controlled” studies that are at the core of the 
drug approval process.241 Federal law currently provides that 
an application for a new drug cannot be approved unless the 
FDA finds that there is “substantial evidence that the drug will 
have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the 
conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the 
proposed labeling thereof.”242 “Substantial evidence” is in turn 
defined as “evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled 
investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts 
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the drug involved.”243 The adequate and well-
controlled investigations described in the statute refer to what 
are more commonly known as “clinical trials,” and are de-
scribed in FDA regulations as generally involving randomiza-
tion, blinding, and some form of control,244 the familiar charac-
teristics of the gold standard.245
Neither the regulations nor the statute, however, bar the 
utilization of crowdsourcing, not least because they apply only 
to refusing to approve an application for a new drug, while 
crowdsourcing would take place after (conditional) approval. 
Even were this not the case, the regulations are flexible on each 
element of the gold standard, indicating that randomization 
  
 
-genomics-as-a-model-for-crowdsourced-preventive-medicine-research. 
 241. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012). 
 242. Id. (emphasis added).  
 243. Id. (emphasis added). 
 244. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(5) (2013).  
 245. Ted J. Kaptchuk, The Double-Blind, Randomized, Placebo-Controlled 
Trial: Gold Standard or Golden Calf?, 54 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 541, 541 
(2000). 
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and blinding are only “usually” required, that controls other 
than placebo control are acceptable in some cases, and that 
even “uncontrolled studies . . . will be considered on their mer-
its.”246 In any event they allow the Director of the FDA’s Center 
for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) to “waive in whole 
or in part any of the criteria” for an adequate and well-
controlled investigation, including randomization, control, and 
blinding.247
Because crowdsourcing takes place after a conditional ap-
proval, but could help to clarify both efficacy and safety, it 
straddles the line between pre-approval clinical investigations 
and post-approval monitoring. As is evident from the discussion 
of the FDA post-approval monitoring programs above, the FDA 
has relatively broad discretion in deciding how best to monitor 
the market. Its existing methods range from spontaneous re-
ports from patients or physicians (MedWatch), to Phase 4 clini-
cal trials, to REMS (a program that itself exhibits considerable 
flexibility), to active data mining of databases maintained by 
partner organizations via a specially created Coordinating Cen-
ter (Sentinel). The diversity of data gathering methods suggests 
that there is room to consider a crowdsourcing method that has 
the potential to combine the simplicity of patient-self reporting 
with the scope of Sentinel, while having the potential addition-
al advantages transparency, real-time data, reduction in tran-
scription errors, broad public participation, and low cost. At a 
minimum, the crowdsourcing model could alert the FDA to po-
tential issues that could then be explored with more robust 
methods. This canary-in-the-coal-mine approach is already re-
flected in the MedWatch system as discussed above.
  
248
2. Crowdsourcing Will Present Unacceptable Risks to Patient 
Privacy 
  
The reporting, storage, and analysis of personal health in-
formation raises legitimate privacy concerns that must be con-
sidered in the creation and implementation of any health-
related crowdsourcing system. In order to design a system that 
 
 246. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(e); see also id. § 314.126(b)(2)(i) (explaining that 
placebo-controlled studies “usually include[] randomization and blinding of 
patients or investigators, or both” (emphasis added)); id. § 314.126(b)(2)(iii), 
(iv) (allowing for “no treatment concurrent control” and “active treatment con-
current control,” instead of placebo control); id. § 314.126(b)(2)(v) (providing 
for the use of historical controls in “special circumstances”). 
 247. Id. § 314.126(c). 
 248. See supra Part II.C.3. 
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adequately protects patient privacy, it is important to focus on 
those aspects of privacy that matter most to the people whose 
privacy is at stake. Privacy concerns do not arise from the sim-
ple fact that information relates to health, but from a concern 
that sensitive and personal health information that an individ-
ual wishes to remain private might be used needlessly, wrong-
fully, or without authorization for a purpose of which the indi-
vidual would not approve. Privacy rules exist primarily to 
protect the reasonable expectations of the individuals involved, 
and to prevent adverse action or outcomes of the wrongful use 
of that information. 
One should therefore not assume that any system that ag-
gregates the health information of individuals into a useful 
form that is publicly disclosed is inherently unworkable due to 
privacy concerns. In fact, existing laws and policies already ag-
gregate health information of individuals and disclose it public-
ly. Clinical trial results aggregate what is in some cases very 
personal health information from hundreds or thousands of in-
dividuals, and make it available to the public as part of the pa-
tient package inserts that accompany prescriptions in paper 
form and which are also available online. For example, one pa-
tient package insert notes that of 199 people who took Ditropan 
(oxybutynin chloride), 15.1% experienced constipation.249 Simi-
larly, the FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS), 
which includes adverse event report forms submitted by indi-
vidual patients, makes available to the public not only aggre-
gated statistical information from these reports,250 but also 
“raw data consisting of individual case safety reports extracted 
from the FAERS database.”251 The FAERS website also makes 
clear that individual case safety reports can be obtained under 
the Freedom of Information Act.252
 
 249. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REFERENCE ID 3105471, DITROPAN, 9 tbl.3 
(2012), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2012/ 
017577s038lbl.pdf. 
 
 250. FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS) Statistics, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory 
Information/Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/ucm070093.htm (last updated 
June 11, 2013).  
 251. FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS) (formerly AERS), U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance 
RegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/default.htm (last up-
dated Sept. 10, 2013).  
 252. Id. 
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The key to establishing a crowdsourcing system that ade-
quately protects privacy is to combine informed contribution of 
data with mechanisms to ensure that information is not indi-
vidually identifiable. Unlike the FAERS database, where public 
access to case reports requires technical knowledge of relational 
databases, the proposed crowdsourcing model would allow us-
ers to easily view aggregated data with respect to a particular 
pharmaceutical product. By viewing the aggregated data of 
others, consumers will have a good idea of how their infor-
mation will be used even before signing the click-through pri-
vacy agreement and entering their own data. Anonymity could 
be assured by making available for public display only infor-
mation that is not personally identifiable, to the extent that 
personally identifiable information must be entered at all.253 
Current regulations already require similar anonymizing with 
respect to the reporting of adverse drug events.254
Health-related privacy concerns have been addressed at 
length by the federal Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) which, along with its associ-
ated regulations, provides helpful guidance that could be used 
in the creation of a crowdsourcing system to ensure adequate 
protection of patient privacy.
 
255 The regulations allow certain 
uses of protected health information if consent256 or authoriza-
tion is obtained.257 Additional flexibilities are contemplated 
with respect to the disclosure of protected (i.e., individually 
identifiable258
 
 253. Names, social security numbers, and other personally identifiable in-
formation might need to be entered, for example, to ensure against fraudulent 
entries by pharmaceutical companies or their competitors who seek to boost 
(or detract from) the performance outcomes measured by the crowdsourcing 
platform. Even if the entry of such information is necessary, however, it could 
be segregated from the information that is displayed or publicly made availa-
ble. 
) health information to public health authorities 
or others in connection with post-marketing surveillance or 
 254. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(h) (2013) (“An applicant should not in-
clude in [adverse event] reports under this section the names and addresses of 
individual patients; instead, the applicant should assign a unique code num-
ber to each report, preferably not more than eight characters in length.”). 
 255. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 
Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. 
 256. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(b) (2012).  
 257. Id. § 164.508; see also § 164.510 (allowing for use or disclosure of pro-
tected health information “provided that the individual is informed in advance 
of the use or disclosure and has the opportunity to agree to or prohibit or re-
strict the use or disclosure”).  
 258. Id. § 160.103. 
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tracking of FDA-regulated products.259 The regulations also 
provide for liberal use of “de-identified information” and 
acknowledge the possibility that individually identifiable in-
formation could be de-identified yet be designed to be re-
identifiable, if medically necessary for example, by the use of a 
code.260 The de-identification provisions are particularly helpful 
for suggesting information that should not be made available to 
the public: names, address or zip code (the first three digits of 
zip codes can be used so long as the resulting geographic area 
contains more than 20,000 people), telephone numbers, email 
addresses, social security numbers, Internet Protocol address 
numbers, and any other data that presents more than a “very 
small” risk “that the information could be used, alone or in 
combination with other reasonably available information . . . to 
identify an individual.”261
3. Uncertainty Cannot Be Adequately Communicated 
 The detailed regulations of HIPAA 
would thus provide a useful starting point in addressing priva-
cy concerns. Nevertheless, additional challenges must also be 
addressed, including difficulties in communicating uncertainty 
and opposition from various groups.  
An additional concern is that, outside the highly regulated 
structure of traditional clinical trials, participants in a 
crowdsourcing system could not adequately comprehend the 
risks that remain. This failure of understanding could take ei-
ther of two forms. First, participants may not adequately ap-
preciate that a drug that has been released to the public as 
“conditionally approved” by the FDA could nevertheless carry 
substantial risks including the risk of death. Yet this concern is 
no different than what exists under the status quo, and is the 
very problem that conditional approval combined with 
crowdsourcing is designed to solve. As discussed above, the es-
tablishment of “conditional approval,” oral risk disclosures by a 
prescriber, and written or visual disclosures on the product it-
self, combined with the act of visiting and contributing to an 
Internet-based crowdsourcing platform can only increase pa-
tient’s recognition of risk as compared to the current system.  
The second failure, however, is that all of the additional 
disclosures, visual cues, and other warning signals might over-
shoot their goal, inducing patients to overestimate the risks 
 
 259. Id. § 164.512.  
 260. Id. § 164.502(d)(2). 
 261. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1)(i).  
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that remain. As a result, patients who could potentially benefit 
from treatments might forgo them out of fear. This is not just a 
theoretical problem: this is the very problem that has frustrat-
ed vaccination campaigns and associated disease eradication 
efforts for centuries, namely, that perceived risks are wildly out 
of proportion to actual risks.262 Although providing numerical 
risk information to patients is an obvious solution, even this 
can be problematic. Studies in the European Union have shown 
that when patients are presented with drug risk information in 
either percentage or verbal terms, they tend to overestimate 
risk.263
Nevertheless, there are several reasons that concerns of 
risk overestimation are a manageable in the case of 
crowdsourcing. First, unlike vaccination campaigns, which of-
ten involve inducing individuals who are not ill to take a medi-
cine that solves no existing discomfort, crowdsourcing would 
occur in most cases only after an individual voluntarily pre-
sents at the doctor’s office with a problem significant enough to 
motivate the visit. Second, the user-friendly presentation of ag-
gregated data that is part of the crowdsourcing system would 
itself help to educate patients about the potential risks and 
benefits. Improved understanding of a drug’s risk/benefit pro-
file is, after all, the major objective of crowdsourcing. Summary 
results from pre-approval clinical trials could also be made ac-
cessible in a user-friendly format as part of the crowdsourcing 
 In any event, crowdsourcing is designed to develop risk 
information that does not yet exist, so that same information 
could not possibly be made available to consumers prior to their 
participation in the crowdsourcing platform. 
 
 262. See Martin Kaufman, The American Anti-Vaccinationists and Their 
Arguments, 41 BULL. HIST. MED. 463, 471 (1967) (noting the professed belief 
that vaccination caused “scrofula, cancer, and innumerable other ills” and 
“spread smallpox on an epidemic scale” (quoting Edward Jenner)); Robert M. 
Wolf & Lisa K. Sharp, Anti-Vaccinationists Past and Present, 325 BRIT. MED. 
J. 430, 431 (2002) (noting the long history of objection to vaccination, based in 
part on parents’ beliefs that vaccination was not efficacious or safe). Similarly, 
the belief that vaccination causes autism, based on a 1998 Lancet article, was 
subsequently debunked, renounced by most of its co-authors, and the article 
retracted by the publisher. See Claudia Wallis, Debunked, TIME, Feb. 15, 2010, 
at 18.  
 263. See P. Knapp et al., Perceived Risk of Medicine Side Effects in Users of 
a Patient Information Website: A Study of the Use of Verbal Descriptors, Per-
centages, and Natural Frequencies, 14 BRIT. J. HEALTH PSYCHOL. 579, 580 
(2009) (citing studies); see also Moore & McQuay, supra note 39, at 42 (report-
ing study results showing that patients find it challenging to understand risk 
levels when presented in words, e.g. “very common,” and even more difficult to 
understand risk levels when presented in numbers).  
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platform. Third, unlike vaccines, the effectiveness of most new 
drugs does not approach anywhere near 100%, and so a failure 
to consume these medicines has an arguably far smaller nega-
tive impact on health. Moreover, even in those unfortunate cas-
es where the failure to take a medicine does substantially im-
pair the health the individual, it generally would not threaten 
the health of hundreds or thousands of other individuals, as 
could the failure to be vaccinated.  
Moreover, an overestimation of risks is less likely to occur 
if appropriate, clearly presented information is made available 
to patients. For example, consent forms might summarize in 
table format the tiny percentages of serious adverse events oc-
curring in recently approved drugs, or even in familiar over-
the-counter drugs such as aspirin, in order to provide a base-
line of risk. The European Union (EU) studies cited above ad-
dressed an EU guideline that recommended presenting risk in-
formation by the use of five qualitative descriptions: very rare, 
rare, uncommon, common, very common. Given that these 
words are entirely devoid of precision, the study findings that 
patients were unable to divine their percentage equivalents is 
hardly surprising, if not particularly expected. In one study, 
patients quite reasonably estimated, on average, that “very 
common” meant an incidence of approximately 65%, but under 
the European Union guidelines this label could have indicated 
a frequency of only around 10%.264 Doctors were similarly una-
ble to understand the EU guidelines, estimating that “common” 
meant around 25%, while the guidelines translated this as 
meaning as little as 1%.265
One might also look to history for reassurance that the sky 
will not fall if additional cautionary disclosures are made. Ac-
cording to one commentator, “[w]hen informed consent as an 
official doctrine was first mandated by federal regulation in the 
early 1980s, many researchers in the scientific community wor-
ried that detailing the potential risks of participation would 
frighten away prospective human subjects.”
 While these studies suggest that 
communication of risk information may require some fore-
thought, they should not be read to suggest that efforts at 
communicating risk are futile.  
266
 
 264. Berry et al., supra note 
 Despite theorized 
concerns, the number of clinical trials more than doubled be-
39, at 853–54.  
 265. Knapp et al., supra note 263, at 581. 
 266. FISHER, supra note 51, at 169.  
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tween 1988 and 1998,267 and by late 2013 there were over 
138,000 clinical trials registered at ClinicalTrials.gov.268
Despite these figures, it is reasonable to expect some de-
crease in consumption as a result of better risk disclosure. A 
small decrease in the number of patients willing to try a new 
medicine, however, is desirable to the extent that patients who 
have the greatest risk aversion should be free to decline treat-
ment on the basis of accurate and complete information. Declin-
ing conditionally approved treatment is particularly appropri-
ate for drugs for which there are equally effective and time-
tested substitutes, as was the case with Vioxx.  
  
4. Opposition from Industry and Physicians 
The presence of conditional approval, special symbols and 
other warnings may deter some patients from accepting a med-
ication, and some doctors from prescribing it, a result that en-
gender opposition from sponsoring pharmaceutical companies. 
Industry opposition can be expected to be all the more intense 
because reduced sales immediately following approval have the 
greatest effect on the lifetime revenues of a drug. Revenues 
during the initial years are worth more not only because of the 
time value of money and the discounting of future revenue, but 
also because early sales can build brand loyalty and increase 
patient (and doctor) switching costs.  
It is not only pharmaceutical companies that are likely to 
resist change. Physicians may be concerned that, in some cases, 
declining treatment may not be in the best interests of patients, 
or that patients may irrationally overvalue the magnitude of 
risk and simultaneously undervalue the benefit of the drug. 
More cynically, physicians might worry that providing patients 
with additional information about a drug can adversely affect 
the doctor-patient relationship, upsetting the power dynamic 
between physicians and their patients and leading doctors to 
experience an erosion of the value of their medical advice.  
For a number of reasons, these hypothesized concerns of 
pharmaceutical companies and physicians are insufficient to 
justify preservation of the status quo. From a policy perspec-
 
 267. David L. Sackett & John Hoey, Why Randomized Controlled Trials 
Fail but Needn’t: A New Series Is Launched, 162 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 
1301, 1301 (2000).  
 268. Trends, Charts, Maps, CLINICALTRIALS.GOV, http://www.clinicaltrials 
.gov/ct2/resources/trends#RegisteredStudiesOverTime (last visited Nov. 25, 
2013).  
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tive, any hypothesized fear that additional risk disclosure 
would lead patients to irrationally overvalue risk and under-
value benefit ignores the evidence that patient bias currently 
tends heavily in the other direction.269
[The government does not have] an interest in preventing the dissem-
ination of truthful commercial information in order to prevent mem-
bers of the public from making bad decisions with the information. . . . 
“There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic ap-
proach [of preventing the dissemination of truthful information]. That 
alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, 
that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well 
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the 
channels of communication rather than to close them . . . .”
 To the contrary, then, 
additional disclosure would help to right current patient mis-
perceptions of risk and value. Nor is there any basis in law for 
denying patients ready access to relevant and truthful risk in-
formation. As the Supreme Court has stated:  
270
Although the Supreme Court was speaking in the First 
Amendment context, it is similarly paternalistic and wrong in 
the present context to withhold accurate information from pa-
tients in order to prevent them from making bad decisions. In 
addition, providing patients with accurate information is effi-
cient in an economic sense: the patient, not the doctor, knows 
the patient’s own level of risk aversion or risk preference. By 
providing the patient with more information on which to base a 
decision, those patients who are more risk averse will self-
select to decline the medication. Doctors cannot know the level 
of risk aversion of their patients better than the patients them-
selves do.
 
271
 
 269. See, e.g., Joel J. Davis, Riskier than We Think? The Relationship be-
tween Risk Statement Completeness and Perceptions of Direct to Consumer Ad-
vertised Prescription Drugs, 5 J. HEALTH COMM.: INT’L PERSP. 349, 365 (2000) 
(noting an “FDA/Prevention Magazine finding that a majority of consumers 
believe that DTC advertising makes the advertised drugs appear harmless”); 
Schwartz et al., supra note 
 
99, at 524 (explaining that patients tend to overes-
timate efficacy by a factor of ten or more); cf. Peter H. Schwartz & Eric M. 
Meslin, The Ethics of Information: Absolute Risk Reduction and Patient Un-
derstanding of Screening, 23 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 867, 867 (2008) 
(“[R]esearch shows that individuals overestimate the benefits and underesti-
mate the possible risks of [medical] screening.”).  
 270. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374–75 (2002) (quot-
ing Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
770 (1976)). 
 271. Adopting the more expansive “patient-centered” duty to inform—
which requires the disclosure of provider-specific information, such as a par-
ticular physician’s familiarity with a surgical tool—does not resolve this con-
cern because although it addresses the doctor’s particular circumstances it 
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More generally, the great irony of crowdsourcing is that its 
potential to offer substantial improvement over existing meth-
ods may constitute the very reason that it is opposed. A number 
of high-profile examples illustrate the reluctance of businesses 
or institutions to welcome crowdsourcing even when there is 
dramatic potential for greater efficiency. Napster’s vastly more 
efficient (if illegal) means of music distribution by a suddenly-
enabled public led to desperate attempts by the music industry 
to shut down file-sharing; legal online distribution was only re-
luctantly embraced by the industry years after the potential 
had become obvious.272 Despite the meteoric rise of Wikipedia’s 
crowdsourcing model, which has rendered virtually forgotten 
the traditional icons of encyclopedic information such as World 
Book and Collier’s, the world’s most renowned English-
language encyclopedia—the Encyclopedia Britannica—did not 
begin to consider a new, more participatory approach until 
2008.273 Apple Computer’s refusal to crowdsource third-party 
applications when it introduced the Macintosh personal com-
puter in 1984, at a time when IBM was open to such collabora-
tion, led to a squeeze in Apple’s market share from which it has 
still not recovered.274 Apple did not make the same mistake 
with its iPhone, which is open to third-party developers.275
These examples should not be read to suggest that 
crowdsourcing will always produce better results than closed, 
tightly-controlled systems, but they do reflect a tendency to-
ward skepticism and reluctance when it comes to embracing 
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collaboration in a way that may disrupt existing models. This 
reticence may be more pronounced the greater the perceived 
risk of loss of control, the more significant the required shift in 
industry culture or structure, and the larger the potential loss 
of profits. All of these factors are present with the crowdsourc-
ing of clinical trials, and opposition is therefore likely to come 
from many sides. Even if crowdsourcing is limited to post-
approval studies, it may chip away at a potentially significant 
source of income for physicians and contract research organiza-
tions (CROs), and reveal a lessened need for participant re-
cruiters, site administrators, and monitors. Conditional ap-
proval and online participation in drug evaluation will produce 
greater awareness of risks, and may lead to reduced sales to 
the disappointment of drug companies. Doctors, pharmaceuti-
cal companies, and the FDA, who currently exercise near-
oligopoly power over a drug’s perceived utility and risks, may 
fear a loss of collective control as the public comes to have a 
greater role in the data generation and decision-making pro-
cess. This shift in the center of gravity from government regu-
lators, multinational companies, and a learned medical elite to 
ordinary citizens will threaten engrained cultural norms that 
such health matters are beyond the capacity of an untrained 
public. In short, crowdsourcing post-approval clinical trials 
would constitute the regulatory equivalent of a disruptive tech-
nology.276
That change will upset expectations of entrenched inter-
ests is not, of course, a justification for rejecting a new ap-
proach. Instead, crowdsourcing should stand or fall based on 
the extent to which it can more effectively and efficiently serve 
the purposes of clinical trials. As argued above, crowdsourcing 
has the potential to provide better notice to patients about 
risks, closing a troublesome loophole in existing informed con-
sent requirements. The cost savings of disintermediating 
CROs, physicians, and other players may be significant. It is 
true that uncertainty remains as to the quality of data that 
would be produced from a crowdsourcing system. Yet, as ar-
gued above, there is reason to believe that data could be as 
good or better than under the current financially-motivated 
system. It should be recalled that similar concerns were ex-
pressed with the quality of volunteer-contributed Wikipedia ar-
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ticles, but ultimately rejected.277 Moreover, as data quality 
problems are identified, as they inevitably will be, an Internet-
based system can be centrally modified to address them.278
  CONCLUSION   
  
Transitioning from the limited crowdsourcing that already 
occurs today to a more comprehensive process that involves the 
input of large numbers of widely dispersed patients is the next 
natural—and perhaps inevitable—step. Under current clinical 
trial practice, patients are already exposed to risks and misun-
derstood benefits once new drugs are approved by the FDA. 
The proposed system merely attempts to capture the data that 
is already being generated post-approval, but that in most cas-
es is never recorded, analyzed, or made available for the benefit 
of others. More importantly, crowdsourcing clinical trials mer-
its serious consideration because of the ethical problem that it 
addresses. It helps ensure informed consent because the act of 
self-reporting efficacy and side effect information will itself 
serve as a clear indication that the drug is still under study. In 
so doing, it gives patients a greater role in their own health 
care. At the same time, it helps to generate a valuable public 
good: accurate and timely information about the safety and ef-
ficacy of new drugs. Yet there is one more compelling reason to 
crowdsource clinical trials, namely, that it is now far easier and 
less expensive to collect massive amounts of data directly from 
patients. Although the Internet has been developing rapidly 
since at least the mid-1990s, only in the last few years have pa-
tients around the world had the ability to input benefits and 
side effects directly into their computers, phones, or other elec-
tronic devices.  
The extent to which crowdsourcing will supplant existing 
clinical trial practice and the exact form that it will take re-
main to be seen. What is perhaps more certain is that as drug 
development costs continue to climb into the stratosphere and 
the need to rein in healthcare spending takes on increased ur-
gency, something will have to change. The instant proposal is a 
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relatively modest one that involves crowdsourcing of only the 
post-approval phase of drug evaluation, but it is easy to imag-
ine a more expanded version. Because existing clinical trial 
practice already involves human testing, the real question is 
not whether the public should be used as test subjects but how 
to most effectively minimize risk, ensure informed consent, and 
collect useful data. That a networked infrastructure and dis-
tributed patient input will play a greater role in this process is 
almost certain. Indeed, as we have seen it is already occurring 
both within and outside of the FDA. Given the historically gla-
cial pace of change at the FDA and the relative infancy of both 
the Internet and of its use in crowdsourcing, it is likely that 
substantial beneficial  
 
 
